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In the late 1990s, executive compensation skyrocketed,
primarily as a result of the bull market and its effect on com-
pensatory stock options.' As option values escalated higher and
higher, tax advisors became intent on devising a strategy that
would shelter these gains from federal income tax. Eventually,
these advisors came up with a shelter that they believed would
defer tax on these gains for as long as an executive desired.
Pursuant to this tax shelter, which ultimately became known
as the Executive Compensation Strategy, or ECS,2 a participat-
ing executive would sell options to a family limited partnership
in exchange for the partnership's long-term, unsecured promis-
sory note.3 If successful, this shelter would allow the executive
to defer stock option gains for the term of the note.
Use of the ECS shelter was pervasive among corporate ex-
ecutives. The Internal Revenue Service (the IRS) has already
identified more than 100 senior executives at 42 leading public
corporations that participated in the transactions in an attempt
to defer $700 million of stock option gains.4 The IRS suspects
1. See, e.g., Mark Gimein, You Bought. They Sold, FORTUNE, Sept. 2,
2002, at 64; Gretchen Morgenson, Option Pie: Overeating is a Health Hazard,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, § 3, at 1.
2. The shelter transaction is also referred to as the Compensatory Option
Sale Shelter (COSS). See Alvin D. Lurie, That Newtime Religion: Breaking
Another False Idol-The COSS, 57 TAX LAW. 593, 593 (2004).
3. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION., 108TH. CONG., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING
FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
661 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter ENRON INVESTIGATION REPORT] (describ-
ing the shelter); Lee A. Sheppard, Dissecting the Compensatory Option Sale
Shelter, 98 TAX NOTES 871, 871-72 (2003) (describing the shelter).
4. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-17 (Feb. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroomlarticle/O,,id=1 3 55 9 6 ,00.html. (declaring that the
IRS had "identified 42 corporations, many more executives and unreported in-
come of more than $700 million"); Lynnley Browning, I.R.S. Offers Lower Pen-
109320051
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that hundreds more executives used the shelter, resulting in
the loss of at least $1 billion of federal tax revenue. 5 Given the
widespread use of the shelter, it was not surprising to learn
that it was aggressively marketed by almost all of the leading
public accounting firms, 6 with now-defunct Arthur Andersen
considered the premiere seller of the shelter. 7 Among buyers of
the ECS shelter from Andersen was none other than L. Dennis
Kozlowski, the infamous and indicted former CEO of Tyco In-
ternational, who bought the vehicle in an attempt to shelter
$208 million of stock option gains.8
Faced with the widespread use of and publicity9 about the
ECS shelter, the IRS has fought back and is now aggressively
challenging the multitude of ECS transactions that have oc-
curred. 10 While the IRS views the ECS shelter as legally
alty if Shelter Abusers Confess, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at C2 (reporting
that the IRS had already identified "more than 100 senior executives"); Rob
Wells & Jonathan Weil, IRS Indentifies Option Tax Shelter Involving Major
Accounting Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2005, at D2 (noting that "IRS Com-
missioner Mark Everson said the agency has identified 42 corporations, in-
cluding many 'that are household names"').
5. See Browning, supra note 4.
6. See Wells & Weil, supra note 4 (reporting that the ECS was sold by
Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Arthur
Andersen LLP). The only major public accounting firm not implicated in the
ECS scheme appears to be Deloitte & Touche LLP.
7. See David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Disallows a Shelter Intended To Delay
the Tax on Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at C1.
8. See Johnston, supra note 7; Miles Weiss, IRS Probing Kozlowski's
Taxes, Bloomberg News, NAT'L POST (Toronto), July 27, 2002, at FP4.
9. The ECS shelter has been extensively and prominently reported in the
popular press. See, e.g., Ken Brown & John D. McKinnon, IRS Later Opposed
Tax Strategies Sold by Auditor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2003, at A3; David Cay
Johnston, Big Accounting Firm's Tax Plans Help the Wealthy Conceal Income,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at Al; Johnston, supra note 7; Weiss, supra note 8,
at FP4. The technical tax literature also has discussed and analyzed the ECS
shelter. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 2, at 593; Diane M. McGowan & A. Thomas
Brisendine, Selling Stock Options, 14 BENEFITS L.J. 89 (2001) [hereinafter
Selling Stock Options]; Diane M. McGowan & A. Thomas Brisendine, Selling
Stock Options Revisited in Light of Notice 2003-47, 16 BENEFITS L.J. 94 (2003)
[hereinafter Selling Stock Options Revisited]; Lee Sheppard, Compensatory
Option Sale Shelter Resolved, 39 TAX NOTES 123 (2003); Sheppard, supra note
3.
10. See I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132. In late 2004, the IRS
released a coordinated issue paper addressed to all industries concerning the
ECS shelter transaction. See IRS Coordinated Issue Paper, Transfer or Sale of
Compensatory Options or Restricted Stock to Related Persons (Oct. 15, 2004),
available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/compensatory-fmal.pdf [hereinafter IRS
Coordinated Issue Paper]. Shortly before this Article went to press, the IRS
announced an offer of amnesty to executives who participated in the shelter.
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flawed,1' litigation on the issue is pending and no court has
weighed in on the matter as of yet. Prior commentators who
have analyzed the strategy have concluded that its likelihood of
success depends on the factual question of whether the sale of
the options from the executive to the family partnership was
made at arm's-length. 12 While it is true that the ECS shelter
will fail to produce the intended tax benefits if the sale of the
options to the partnership is not viewed as arm's-length, the is-
sue of whether this sale can be fairly described as an arm's-
length transaction is a factual one on which reasonable minds
may perhaps differ.13 This Article will illustrate that, even if
the executive's sale of the stock options to the partnership is
considered to be at arm's-length, the ECS shelter nonetheless
fails.
For the ECS shelter to provide the sought-after tax defer-
ral, the partnership's promissory note cannot constitute "prop-
erty" for purposes of § 83 of the Internal Revenue Code. 14 If the
promissory note constitutes property under § 83, then the ex-
ecutive is taxed immediately upon its receipt. 15 Promoters of
the ECS shelter argue that the partnership's promissory note is
not property because it constitutes an "unfunded and unse-
cured promise to pay money in the future," which is explicitly
carved out of the definition of property under the § 83 regula-
tions. 16 As is typical of tax shelter promoters,' 7 their interpreta-
See I.R.S. Announcement 2005-19, Executive Stock Options Settlement Initia-
tive, (Feb. 22, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/a-05-19.pdf.
In general, the offer requires the executive to recognize compensation income
equal to the fair market value of stock options used in the ECS. Id. at 1-2. The
primary benefit to the executive of participating in the amnesty program is
that it would reduce the civil tax penalty from 20% to 10% on the understated
income. Id. at 4.
11. I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132; see also J. Christine Harris,
IRS Officials Explain Recent Guidance on ISOs, FLP Notes, 100 TAX NOTES
452 (2003).
12. Compare Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 95-96 (concluding
that the ECS may be viewed as an arm's-length transfer), with Sheppard, su-
pra note 3, at 873 (concluding that the ECS cannot be viewed as an arm's-
length transfer).
13. Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 93; Sheppard, supra note 3, at
873 ("No rational person would make a 30-year bet on interest rates with a
purchaser whose ability to pay was contingent on resale of the property.").
14. See I.R.C. § 83 (2000).
15. See Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 97-101.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985); see also Draft Opinion
Letter from Arthur Andersen to Mr. Client (1999), in ENRON INVESTIGATION
REPORT, supra note 3, app. D, at 336-40 [hereinafter Arthur Andersen Opin-
10952005]
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tion is overly literal, ignoring entirely the history, context, and
purpose of the regulatory definition. Instead, this Article ar-
gues that the exclusion for an unfunded and unsecured promise
to pay applies only to a promise to pay issued by the recipient
of the taxpayer's services (second-party promise). If the promise
to pay is issued by a party external to the service relationship
(third-party promise), such a promise constitutes property for
purposes of § 83.18 Accordingly, the receipt of a third-party
promise to pay in connection with the performance of services
is always immediately taxable to the service provider, regard-
less of the nature of the promise. 19
Though the proliferation of the ECS shelter served as the
stimulus for this Article, the issue addressed in this Article-
whether compensatory third-party promises to pay are taxable
upon receipt-is an important one in the larger context of de-
ferred compensation. 20 It is also apparently one that many
commentators believe is an open question. For example, Martin
D. Ginsburg and Jack S. Levin have identified the question in
their authoritative treatise as one that "has long been an unre-
solved issue."21 Furthermore, the issue is one that has caused a
fair amount of confusion in the courts.22 We hope that this Arti-
ion Letter].
17. See Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax
Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 27 (2004) (noting that the courts' use of "textual-
ism embolden[s] tax shelter advisors to push the limits").
18. Executives who used the ECS shelter would be cash method taxpay-
ers. Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, it is assumed that any recipient
of a third-party promise is a cash method taxpayer. Accrual method taxpayers
would generally be taxed at the time the right to payment accrues, regardless
of whether the right to payment emanates from a second party or third party.
For a further discussion of the distinction between the cash and accrual meth-
ods of accounting, see text accompanying notes 112-13.
19. If our analysis is correct, then the third-party promise issue is a silver
bullet for the ECS shelter. For the shelter to succeed, the executive must ar-
gue that the sale of the options is an arm's-length transaction because fair
market value was received for the options. See Selling Stock Options, supra
note 9, at 93-96; Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 335-38. If
the partnership's promise is immediately taxable to the executive, then the
executive is taxed on the fair market value of the promise, which must, in an
arm's-length transaction, equal the value of the options. As a result, the
sought-after deferral is lost, as the executive is taxed immediately on the fair
market value of the options.
20. See 3 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYouTs, Ch. 1502.1.1 at 15-25 n.21 (June 2003 ed.) (not-
ing that the issue is important in the deferred compensation context).
21. Id.
22. Two cases that have failed to appreciate or understand the distinction
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cle proves that the law is not nearly as unclear as is commonly
believed.23
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes in more
detail the mechanics of the ECS shelter and the tax issues it
generates, focusing on the tax treatment of the partnership's
promise to pay. Part II describes the taxation of compensatory
promises to pay under general tax principles that preceded the
enactment of § 83 of the Code, emphasizing that tax law has
traditionally drawn an important distinction between second-
party promises, which are generally not immediately taxable,
and third-party promises, which are. Part III then argues that
neither the enactment of § 83 nor the promulgation of its regu-
lations should be understood to have changed this traditional
tax treatment of compensatory promises. Therefore, Part III
concludes that compensatory third-party promises, like the
partnership's promise to the executive in the ECS transactions,
are always immediately taxable. Finally, Part IV explains how
the immediate taxation of third-party promises is justified by
policy considerations.
I. THE ECS SHELTER
A. THE MECHANICS OF THE SHELTER
While the hallmark of many tax shelters is transactional
complexity, 24 the ECS shelter is remarkably straightforward. It
involves the sale by the executive of compensatory stock options
to a limited partnership owned by the executive and members
of his family (commonly referred to as a family limited partner-
ship).25 The partnership would have been previously capitalized
by the partners with an amount of cash equal to 10% of the
between a second-party promise and a third-party promise in determining the
timing of income recognition are Childs v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 634 (1994),
and Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985). These cases are dis-
cussed in Part III.C.2.
23. At least one commentator shares our view that the issue is unambigu-
ous. See GEORGE L. WHITE, ACCOUNTING METHODS-GENERAL PRINCIPLES, at
A-64 (BNA Tax Mgt. Portfolio No. 570, 1996) ("When the transfer is of obliga-
tions of a third party, they are 'property.'").
24. Many tax shelters consist of a Byzantine array of financial transac-
tions. See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Long Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004).
25. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 319-20; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 90; Sheppard, supra note 3, at 871-72.
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value of the options to be transferred.26 In consideration for the
options, the partnership transfers to the executive a long-term
(typically fifteen to thirty years), unsecured, and nonassignable
balloon note with a face amount equal to the value of the op-
tions.27 The promissory note would require that interest be paid
to the executive on an annual basis.28 Immediately after the
sale, the family limited partnership would exercise the options,
sell the underlying stock, and invest the proceeds in other in-
vestment assets.29
The primary goal of the strategy is tax deferral. 30 Propo-
nents of the shelter argue that, as a result of these transac-
tions, the executive does not realize any income (apart from
annual interest payments received from the partnership) until
he receives the balloon payment of principal under the promis-
sory note.31 According to this view, the interim exercise of the
stock options by the partnership carries no tax consequences to
26. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 319-20; Sale of
Executive Options Technique-Advantages and Disadvantages, in ENRON
INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, app. D, at 310 [hereinafter Sale of Ex-
ecutive Options Technique]. Presumably, the capitalization of the partnership
with 10% cash was intended solely to bolster the argument that the sale of the
options was an arm's-length transaction. For a discussion of the arm's-length
issue, see text accompanying notes 74-82.
27. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 872.
28. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 320; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 94. Marketing materials indicated that the
partnership note would bear a "marketable rate" of interest. See Sale of Ex-
ecutive Options Technique, supra note 26, at 311. A draft Arthur Andersen
opinion letter indicated that the partnership note would bear interest at 8%.
Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 320. Based on these mate-
rials, it appears that the promoters intended that the note bear interest at a
rate greater than the pertinent applicable federal rate as set forth in I.R.C.
§ 1274(d)(1) (2000). For a discussion of the effect of the interest rate on the
success of the shelter, see note 82 and accompanying text.
29. See Sheppard, supra note 3, at 872; Sale of Executive Options Tech-
nique, supra note 26, at 310 (stating that "executive gets the opportunity to
diversify his/her portfolio without having an immediate tax payment due from
exercising the options").
30. See Lurie, supra note 2, at 594. A second goal of the ECS shelter
might be to convert the character of any subsequent appreciation of the op-
tions from ordinary income to capital gain. However, marketing materials for
the ECS indicated that, in the usual case, the partnership would immediately
exercise the options and sell the underlying stock, foreclosing the possibility of
this character shift. See Sale of Executive Options Technique, supra note 26,
at 312.
31. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 340; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 90; Sheppard, supra note 3, at 872.
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the executive. 32 However, while the executive treats the sale of
the options to the partnership in exchange for the balloon note
as a nonevent for tax purposes, the partnership claims a pur-
chase cost basis in the options.33 As a result, the partnership
realizes no gain when the options are exercised and the under-
lying stock is sold. 34
The mechanics of the ECS shelter can be illustrated using
a simple example. Assume that an executive has options to buy
stock with a current fair market value of $6 million at an ag-
gregate exercise price of $500,000. Assume further that the fair
market value of these options is $5.5 million.35 Pursuant to the
32. Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 335-36; Lurie, su-
pra note 2, at 596-97.
33. See Sheppard, supra note 3, at 872. Two commentators have argued
that, when the executive sells the options to the partnership, the § 453 in-
stallment method should apply. See James R. Hamill & Roger W. Lusby, In-
trafamily Installment Sales of Nonqualified Stock Options, 31 TAX ADVISER
494, 498-99 (2000). However, installment method reporting is not available in
this context. In Sorenson v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 321 (1954), the Tax Court
determined that the cash and promissory notes received upon the sale of com-
pensatory stock options themselves constituted compensation to the taxpayer.
Noting that the predecessor to § 453 did not "in anywise purport to relate to
the reporting of income by way of compensation for services," the court re-
jected the taxpayer's claim that the compensation income attributable to the
receipt of the promissory note be reported on an installment basis. Sorenson,
22 T.C. at 342; see also Sheppard, supra note 3, at 873 (discussing the impact
of the Sorenson decision in this context). The basis for the Sorenson decision-
that the consideration received in the sale of compensatory stock options itself
constitutes compensation income-is maintained under the § 83 regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978) (last sentence). Accordingly, the executive
selling compensatory stock options pursuant to the ECS shelter would not be
entitled to report income resulting from the sale on an installment basis.
34. See Hamill & Lusby, supra note 33, at 498. According to proponents,
when the partnership sells the underlying stock, it will realize capital gain or
loss to the extent of the difference between (i) the sales proceeds and (ii) the
sum of (a) the amount the partnership paid for the options and (b) the exercise
price paid by the partnership upon exercise. Id. If the sale occurs more than a
year after the partnership purchased the options, the capital gain or loss
would be long-term, otherwise it would be short-term. See I.R.C. § 1222 (2000).
In the usual case, the partnership would exercise the options and sell the stock
immediately upon receipt of the options; as a result, any capital gain or loss
would generally be minimal and short-term. See Sale of Executive Options
Technique, supra note 26, at 311 (noting that "most partnerships exercise the
options and sell the underlying shares immediately").
35. As discussed below, there are two components of an option that pro-
vide value. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. The first is the
spread, the difference between the current fair market value of the underlying
stock and the exercise price. The second is the option privilege, the ability to
participate in further appreciation of the stock without risking any capital. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (1978). In the example above, the spread equals
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strategy, the executive and his relatives form a limited part-
nership by contributing $550,000 in cash. The partnership then
purchases the options, issuing a $5.5 million balloon note to the
executive. The note bears 8% interest payable annually and
would mature in thirty years. Immediately after acquiring the
options, the partnership exercises the options36 and then sells
the underlying stock for $6 million. Last, the partnership in-
vests the sale proceeds in a diversified portfolio. 37
Proponents of the shelter argue that the resulting tax con-
sequences are as follows: First and foremost, the executive real-
izes no income upon the sale of the options to the partnership.38
The partnership, on the other hand, takes a $5.5 million basis
in the options.3 9 Furthermore, when the partnership exercises
the options by paying the $500,000 exercise price, neither the
executive nor the partnership realizes any income upon such
exercise. 40 This leaves the partnership owning stock valued at
$6 million in which the partnership has a $6 million basis.
Thus, when the partnership sells the stock for its fair market
value, the partnership realizes no gain on the sale.41
If the strategy is successful, the executive will not realize
any income upon the sale of the options to the partnership until
the balloon payment is received in Year 30. At that point, the
executive will realize $5.5 million of ordinary income. 42 By com-
parison, had the executive maintained ownership of the options
and exercised them in his individual capacity, this $5.5 million
of ordinary income would have been realized immediately upon
such exercise.
$5,500,000 and because the fair market value of the options is $5,500,000,
there is no value assigned to the option privilege. This zero value for the op-
tion privilege is not entirely unrealistic because, given the large spread, the
risk that the stock would drop below the exercise price during the remaining
option period may be quite low, especially if the option is to expire shortly.
36. In the example, the partnership has $550,000 cash on hand to exercise
the options. If the entity did not have sufficient cash on hand to pay the option
exercise price, it could make a so-called cashless exercise by borrowing money
to fund the purchase and then repaying the loan with a portion of the sales
proceeds upon the sale of the underlying stock.
37. See Sale of Executive Options Technique, supra note 26, at 310.
38. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 340.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Hamill & Lusby, supra note 33, at 498; Selling Stock Options, su-
pra note 9, at 101.
42. Of course, the executive will have to report the annual interest pay-
ments as they are received.
1100 [89:1092
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B. BACKGROUND REGARDING THE TAXATION OF COMPENSATORY
STOCK OPTIONS
Before analyzing the specific tax issues raised by the ECS
structure, it is helpful first to discuss more generally the nature
of compensatory stock options and how they are taxed. A stock
option grants the recipient the right, but not the obligation, to
purchase a share of stock at a specified price (the exercise
price) during a specified period of time (the option period). 43
Upon grant, options can be "in the money," meaning that the
fair market value of the underlying stock exceeds the specified
exercise price.4 4 Even an option that is not currently in the
money can be quite valuable because the option holder can par-
ticipate in any future appreciation of the underlying stock
above the exercise price without putting any capital at risk.45
This opportunity to participate in appreciation without risk is
known as the option privilege. 46 This option privilege makes
the valuation of options especially difficult, 47 and it is this
valuation difficulty that is the rationale for the special tax
treatment of compensatory stock options. 48
The taxation of nonqualified compensatory options is gov-
erned by § 83 of the Code. 49 This provision, enacted as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969,50 is a broad statute that governs
the timing of the taxation of property received in connection
with the performance of services. Long before the enactment of
43. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 547 (5th ed. 1999).
Technically, the term "option" can refer to options to buy (i.e., call options) or
options to sell (i.e., put options). Id. at 547, 549. Because this Article deals only
with compensatory options, which are always call options, all references to
"options" refer to call options only.
44. See id. at 547.
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (1978).
46. Id.
47. The valuation of the option privilege depends on five factors: (1) the
length of the option period; (2) the volatility of the underlying stock; (3) the
current fair market value of the underlying stock; (4) the exercise price; and
(5) prevailing interest rates. ROSS ET AL., supra note 43, at 555-57.
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3) (1978).
49. Compensatory options are given drastically different tax treatment
under the Code, depending on whether the options constitute either incentive
stock options on the one hand, or nonincentive stock options ("nonqualified
stock options") on the other hand. See I.R.C. §§ 421-422 (2000). Because the
ECS shelter was designed to be implemented with respect to nonqualified
stock options, it is assumed for purposes of this Article that all options are
nonqualified.
50. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 321, 83 Stat. 487, 588-
92 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 83 (2000)).
2005] 1101
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§ 83, it was clear that, when property is transferred from a ser-
vice recipient to a service provider, (a) the service provider is
taxed on the fair market value of the property, and (b) the ser-
vice recipient is allowed a deduction, assuming that the pay-
ment for services otherwise qualifies for a deduction under the
Code.5 1 Section 83 was added to clarify precisely the timing of
these tax consequences.
Specifically, the provisions of § 83 become important when
the transferred property is unvested, meaning that there exists
a substantial risk that the service provider may forfeit the
transferred property for some reason.5 2 In such a case, § 83
provides that the tax consequences arising from the compensa-
tory transfers are realized not when the property is initially
transferred, but rather when the property vests in the service
provider; that is, when the risk of forfeiture lapses. 53 In other
words, when unvested property is transferred, § 83 holds the
tax consequences of the transfer in abeyance until the property
vests, at which time the compensatory transfer is given tax ef-
fect.54
For example, assume that X Corp. transfers 1000 shares of
its stock with a then-existing fair market value of $10,000 to
the executive in Year 1, subject to forfeiture if the executive's
employment terminates before January 1, Year 3. The transfer
is disregarded entirely for tax purposes until the beginning of
Year 3, at which point the transferred stock vests in the execu-
tive.55 At that point, the executive will have ordinary compen-
sation income equal to the then fair market value of the stock.56
51. See 3 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 60.4.1 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that the general
rule of § 83(a) codified propositions that were "as self-evident as any ideas in
the law of taxation"). In addition, upon a compensatory transfer of property,
the service recipient transferor realizes a gain or loss as if the transferred
property were sold for its fair market value. See United States v. Gen. Shoe
Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1960); Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Comm'r, 135
F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943); Riley v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 932, 937 (1962), affd,
328 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1964). Where a corporation makes a compensatory
transfer of its own stock (or of options to purchase its own stock), any such
gain or loss is not recognized. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (2000).
52. See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000).
53. See id. § 83(a), (h).
54. See id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.83-4(a) (1978).
55. See I.R.C. § 83(a).
56. See id.
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In addition, X Corp. will take a deduction in the same amount
at that time.57
Under the general principles of § 83, the receipt of compen-
satory stock options theoretically should be taxable to the re-
cipient at grant or, if the options are unvested, at the time they
vest. The amount of compensation income would equal the fair
market value of the options, which, as discussed above, can be
difficult to ascertain. Because of this difficulty, Congress spe-
cifically mandated that, as a general rule, § 83 would apply to
compensatory stock options only upon exercise of the options
and not upon their grant to the taxpayer. 58 In other words, just
as § 83 effectively ignores the transfer and receipt of unvested
property until the property vests, that section also disregards
the receipt and transfer of compensatory stock options, taxing
the options only upon exercise. 59
For example, if X Corp. grants the executive an option to
purchase 2000 shares of its stock (then having an aggregate
value of $20,000) for an exercise price of $20,000, § 83 does not
apply to the option grant.60 For § 83 purposes, the option grant
is disregarded entirely-it is simply treated as a "tax noth-
ing."61 Only upon exercise of the option does § 83 apply to the
transaction.62 If the executive later exercises the options when
the underlying stock is worth $100,000, the executive would re-
port $80,000 of ordinary compensation income, the difference
between the $100,000 stock (property received in connection
with services) he received and the $20,000 he paid for the
stock.63
Now suppose the option is not exercised by the service pro-
vider but rather is sold or otherwise disposed of in an arm's-
length transaction. Consistent with the theme of treating com-
57. See id. § 83(h).
58. See id. § 83(e)(3).
59. See id. § 83(a).
60. See id. § 83(e)(3).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978). When we say that the option is
treated as a "tax nothing," we mean that the receipt of the option has no sig-
nificance from a tax perspective (i.e., it is disregarded); instead, the latter re-
ceipt of property with respect to the option-whether pursuant to an exercise
of the option or a sale of the option-is the significant tax event. This latter
receipt of property would trigger compensation income to the extent of the fair
market value of the property at the time it was received, reduced by any
amounts paid to acquire the property.
62. See id.
63. Id.
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pensatory stock options as "tax nothings," § 83 applies to the
consideration received in the sale, just as if that consideration
was received directly by the service provider in exchange for
services. 64 This receipt of consideration, taxable as ordinary in-
come, would close the application of § 83 with respect to the op-
tion.65 The purchaser of the option would take a fair market
value basis in the option 66 and, as is the rule with respect to
purchased (i.e., noncompensatory) options,6 7 would realize a
gain or loss only upon the sale or other disposition of the under-
lying stock after exercise of the option.
However, the rules are quite different if the option is dis-
posed of in a transaction that is not at arm's-length, such as a
gift or a part-sale/part-gift transaction. Gratuitous transfers do
not close the application of § 83 with respect to the service pro-
vider.68 Thus, not only will the service provider realize compen-
sation income to the extent of the consideration received on the
initial disposition of the options (as in a part-sale/part-gift
transaction), the service provider will also realize additional
compensation income when the transferee exercises the op-
tions.69 This additional compensation income will be equal to
the fair market value of the stock when the option is exercised,
reduced by the exercise price paid by the transferee and by any
amounts the service provider has previously included in gross
income on account of the options.7 0
C. TAX ISSUES RAISED BY THE ECS SHELTER
Recall the example above where the executive transfers his
options worth $5,500,000 with an aggregate exercise price of
$500,000 to a family limited partnership (previously capitalized
with $550,000 cash) in exchange for a $5,500,000 balloon prom-
issory note.71 To achieve the ECS shelter's primary goal of de-
ferring the executive's ordinary income that would normally oc-
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. I.R.C. § 1012 (2000).
67. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 214 (5th
ed. 2004).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).
69. Id.
70. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-05-006 (Nov. 1, 1999). "Amounts the service
provider has previously included in gross income on account of the options"
would include the amount realized by the transferor in the initial part-
sale/part-gift transaction. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-21-013 (Feb. 23, 1994) at 29.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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cur upon exercise of the option, two conditions must be satis-
fied. First, the transfer must be considered "arm's-length" un-
der the § 83 regulations. 72 Second, the receipt of the partner-
ship's promissory note must not be immediately taxable to the
executive. 7 3
1. The Arm's-Length Requirement
Under the § 83 regulations, if the transfer of the options to
the partnership is not the product of an arm's-length transac-
tion, § 83 still applies to cause the executive to realize ordinary
compensation income upon the exercise of the option by the
partnership, just as if the executive had held onto the options
and exercised them himself.7 4 As a result, unless the transfer is
deemed to be arm's-length, the ECS shelter would fail to
achieve the desired deferral of income that would otherwise be
realized upon exercise of the option.
The § 83 regulations do not define what constitutes an
"arm's-length transaction." 75 On one hand, the transfer of the
options pursuant to the ECS shelter could be considered at
arm's-length so long as the transferor received adequate and
full consideration for the options (the "fair market value defini-
tion").7 6 Under this view, the critical issue would be whether
the value of the partnership's note equaled the value of the
transferred options.77 On the other hand, the definition of
arm's-length could be more restrictive in that it requires that
the parties to the transaction be unrelated, i.e., at arm's-length,
even if fair market value is exchanged (the "unrelated party
definition").7 8 Under this view, the ECS shelter would fail be-
72. See Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 93-96.
73. Id. at 97-101.
74. If, in addition to the lack of "arm's-lengthness," the partnership note is
immediately taxable to the executive, the ECS strategy would actually leave
the executive in a worse position than if he had held onto the option, because
the receipt of the note would accelerate ordinary income without any beneficial
character shift.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7 (1978).
76. Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 328-31; see Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 93-95.
77. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 334-35; see
also Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 94.
78. See Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 95-96; cf. Arthur Andersen
Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 329-31 (suggesting an arm's-length transac-
tion may exist where the transferor received fair market value for the trans-
ferred property).
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cause, regardless of the value of the note, the option transfer
involved two parties that are clearly related.79
As one would expect, the promoters of the shelter argue
that related parties can enter into arm's-length transactions so
long as the consideration that changes hands between the par-
ties is adequate8o A number of recent appellate decisions con-
cerning transfers to family limited partnerships in the estate
tax context strongly support this view.81 However, it is beyond
the scope of this Article, which focuses on the second condition
of the ECS shelter's success, to fully explore how the arm's-
79. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 334-35; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 95-96. In a coordinated issue paper addressing
the ECS shelter, the IRS does not maintain categorically that an arm's-length
transaction can take place only between unrelated parties. Rather, the IRS
adopts an independent third-party investor test, taking into account the en-
tirety of the transaction: "If an independent third party would not have par-
ticipated in the transaction in the manner in which the related parties partici-
pated, the parties did not act at arm's-length." IRS Coordinated Issue Paper,
supra note 10, at 12.
80. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 334-35; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 95-96. The IRS rejects this contention, arguing
that payment of fair market value for the options in and of itself does not ren-der the transaction one entered into at arm's-length. IRS Coordinated Issue
Paper, supra note 10, at 13. Rather, the IRS contends that the arm's-length
characterization entails "something broader, incorporating examination of the
entirety of the transaction and not just whether fair market value was paid."
Id. at 14.
81. In Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth
Circuit addressed the question of whether a transfer of property to a family
limited partnership in exchange for a beneficial interest in the partnership(heavily discounted for valuation purposes) constituted a "bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration for money or money's worth" sufficient to
avoid the application of § 2036. Id. at 261. The district court opinion had sug-
gested that the "bona fide sale" aspect of the exception required a transaction
between unrelated parties. See Kimbell v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 2d 700,
704 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated by 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Cir-
cuit soundly rejected this interpretation, stating that "just because a transac-
tion takes place between family members does not impose an additional re-
quirement not set forth in the statute to establish that it is bona fide."
Kimbell, 371 F.3d at 263 (citations omitted). If an individual can enter into a
bona fide sale with a family-owned partnership, then, by analogy, one would
assume that the parties could enter into an arm's-length transaction. On that
note, in addressing the same issue arising under § 2036 in Estate of Thompson
v. Commissioner, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004), the Third Circuit commented
that an arm's-length transaction provided good evidence of a bona fide sale,
"especially with intrafamily transactions." Id. at 381. The Kimbell and
Thompson decisions therefore support the notion that a transaction between
an individual and a partnership formed by the individual and his family mem-
bers can be described as an arm's-length transaction, provided the considera-
tion is adequate.
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length issue should be resolved in this context. Nevertheless,
we note that even under the less restrictive fair market value
definition, the ECS shelter is extremely vulnerable on the
arm's-length issue because the interest rate on the partner-
ship's note is likely insufficient to compensate the executive for
the partnership's risk of default.8 2
2. The Taxation of the Receipt of the Partnership's Note
The second condition for the ECS shelter's success is that
the receipt of the partnership's note must not be immediately
taxable to the executive.8 3 This condition depends on whether
the note constitutes "property" for § 83 purposes. Although at
first glance it might appear that § 83 does not apply to the
partnership's note because it is issued in exchange for the op-
tions rather than "in connection with the performance of ser-
vices,"8 4 this provision does in fact apply. Treasury Regulation §
1.83-7(a) provides that, when an option is transferred in an
arm's-length transaction (as proponents of the ECS shelter as-
sert), § 83 applies to the consideration received in the transfer,
just as if the consideration had been paid directly by the service
recipient.85 In other words, this regulation treats the option
sale consideration as having been transferred in connection
82. See Sheppard, supra note 3, at 873 (stating that "it is difficult to argue
that the note issued by [the family limited partnership] has any value at all"
and that "[n]o rational person would make a 30-year bet on interest rates with
a purchaser whose ability to pay was contingent on the resale of the prop-
erty"). On the other hand, in Kimbell, the Fifth Circuit signaled that it might
not be particularly vigilant in examining the adequacy of consideration that
transferred hands between an individual and a family limited partnership.
371 F.3d at 257-67. In that case, the court held that an individual's transfer of
property to a family limited partnership in exchange for partnership interests
valued by the individual's estate at roughly 50% of value of the contributed
property constituted "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth" that was excepted from the application of § 2036 in
the estate tax context. Id. at 267. In describing the consideration necessary to
satisfy the "adequate and full consideration" aspect of the exception, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the executive need only receive property having a value
"roughly equivalent" to the value of the transferred property. Id. at 262. Given
the Fifth Circuit's liberal interpretation of what constitutes "roughly equiva-
lent," perhaps courts would not intensely scrutinize whether the partnership
note bore sufficient interest in determining whether the option sale consti-
tuted an arm's-length transaction.
83. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 336-42; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 97-101.
84. I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000).
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).
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with the performance of services, which is entirely consistent
with the regulation's treatment of options as "tax nothings."8 6
Because § 83 applies to the partnership's note, the charac-
terization of the note as either "property" or "not property" for§ 83 purposes is critically important. If it is property, then the
note will be immediately taxable to the executive to the extent
of its fair market value (i.e., $5.5 million) and the shelter will
fail.8 7 If it is not property, then the executive will realize in-
come only if, when, and to the extent that principal payments
are made on the thirty-year balloon note.8 8
The § 83 regulations define the term "property" extremely
broadly to include "real and personal property other than either
money or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or
property in the future."8 9 The exclusion of an unfunded and un-
secured promise to pay from the definition of property means
that the receipt of such a promise carries no current tax conse-
quences under § 83; rather, the tax consequences are deferred
until cash or property is received pursuant to the promise.
The critical question, therefore, is whether the partner-
ship's promissory note constitutes an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay within the meaning of the § 83 regulations. Tak-
ing a literal view of the regulations, proponents of the ECS
shelter argue that the partnership's note fits within the exclu-
sion to the definition of property, emphasizing that the part-
nership note is not secured or funded in any way.90 Under this
view, the fact that the obligor on the note (i.e., the partnership)
is not a party to the service transaction that gave rise to the
stock options is completely irrelevant.9 1 We argue otherwise,
concluding instead in Part III below that the identity of the ob-
ligor is a critical factor in determining whether a promise to
pay constitutes property for purposes of § 83. In our view, a
compensatory promise to pay received from a party that is not
the recipient of the taxpayer's services always constitutes prop-
erty for § 83 purposes. 92
86. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
87. See I.R.C. § 83(a); see also Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra
note 16, at 340; Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 97.
88. See supra note 87.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
90. See Arthur Andersen Opinion Letter, supra note 16, at 340; Selling
Stock Options, supra note 9, at 97-98.
91. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
92. As previously discussed in text accompanying notes 64-67 supra,
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D. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
After its widespread reporting in the national newspapers,
the IRS identified the ECS shelter as a "listed transaction"
through the issuance of Notice 2003-47 (the Notice). 93 The No-
tice also asserted the IRS's view that the ECS shelter was inef-
fective because (a) the ECS transactions "rarely, if ever, reflect
terms that would be agreed to between unrelated parties deal-
ing at arm's-length," and (b) the note was immediately taxable
upon receipt by the executive. 94 Concurrently with the issuance
of the Notice, the Treasury promulgated Temporary Regulation
§ 1.83-7(T), which provides that a sale of compensatory options
between related persons (as defined in the temporary regula-
tion 95) will never close the application of § 83, regardless of the
terms of the sale.9 6 The impact of the temporary regulation,
which is effective for transactions that occur after July 1, 2003,
is that a related-party sale will never be treated as an arm's-
length transaction.9 7 The temporary regulations were made fi-
nal on August 10, 2004, and they now appear as part of Treas-
ury Regulation § 1.83-7(a). 98
There are three important aspects of the government's re-
sponse. First, the regulation destroys the utility of the ECS
shelter for transactions occurring after the effective date. Be-
cause a related-party sale will never close the application of
though formally the partnership's promise might not be viewed as a compen-
satory promise because it was given in exchange for options rather than ser-
vices, the § 83 regulations appropriately treat the promise as a compensatory
promise. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 241.
93. I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132. A listed transaction subjects
the promoter and investors to a host of disclosure requirements. See I.R.C.
§ 6111 (2000) (requiring a tax shelter organizer to register the shelter with the
IRS); id. § 6112 (requiring shelter promoters to maintain lists of investors);
Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2003) (requiring investor to file a
statement disclosing participation in shelter).
94. I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132.
95. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(T)(a)(1) (2003) (incorporating the re-
lated-party rules of §§ 267(b) and 707(b)(1) but reducing the threshold per-
centage to 20%). The definition of a person related to the service provider
within the meaning of the temporary regulation is quite broad. For example, a
partnership in which the taxpayer and the taxpayer's spouse own a combined
20% capital interest is considered a party that is related to the taxpayer for
purposes of the temporary regulation. See id.
96. T.D. 9067, 2003-32 I.R.B. 287 (adding Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(T)(1)
(2003)).
97. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(T)(a),(a)(1) (2003); see also Selling Stock
Options Revisited, supra note 9, at 102-03.
98. T.D. 9148, 2004-37 I.R.B. 460.
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§ 83, the executive will be unable to defer taxation of the op-
tions past the point at which they are exercised by the partner-
ship.
Second, the Notice and the new regulation suggest that the
government's view of the definition of arm's-length is the fair
market value definition, not the unrelated party definition, 99
which is consistent with the view held by the ECS promoters. 100
Therefore, the government's response actually appears to help
the ECS shelters implemented before the temporary regula-
tion's effective date, at least on the arm's-length issue. Accord-
ingly, for pre-July 1, 2003 transactions, it would appear that
the only issue remaining to be litigated on the question of
"arm's-lengthness" is simply whether the value of the partner-
ship's note is equal to the value of the options.'O'
Third, while the Notice clearly asserts the government's
view that the note is immediately taxable upon receipt by the
executive, it provides no authority or reasoning to support this
conclusion.1°2 One can surmise that the rationale is based on
the third-party promise issue discussed in this Article,103 but
the Notice itself simply provides no guidance on this issue.
II. COMMON LAW TAXATION OF PROMISES TO PAY
As previously noted, the critical issue in determining
whether a compensatory deferred payment obligation is cur-
rently taxable to the service provider is whether the payment
99. For instance, Notice 2003-47 indicates that the application of § 83 (for
transactions occurring before the effective date of the temporary regulation)
closes only after a transfer that "reflect[s] terms that would be agreed to be-
tween unrelated parties dealing at arm's-length." I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-
30 I.R.B. 132 (emphasis added). In addition, the effect of the temporary regu-
lation is to treat all related-party transactions as non-arm's length, which
would be superfluous if the unrelated party definition applied to the old regu-
lation. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(T)(a)(1) (2003).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
101. Lurie, supra note 2, at 598.
102. See I.R.S. Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132.
103. See ENRON INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 3, at 662 (concluding
that "whether this obligation is unfunded and unsecured could be challenged
based on the practical meaning and application of the 'unsecured and un-
funded' language of the section 83 regulation in the context of a third-party
note as opposed to an obligation of an employer"). Although it did not elabo-
rate on its reasoning in Notice 2003-47, the IRS in an internal memorandum
recently concluded that the partnership note under the ECS transaction con-
stitutes property for purposes of § 83. See IRS Coordinated Issue Paper, supra
note 10, at 16-18.
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obligation constitutes property for purposes of § 83. While the
regulations under § 83 define property broadly as all real and
personal property other than an "unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay money or property in the future,"'104 the regula-
tions provide no guidance as to the precise meaning of the
terms "unfunded" and "unsecured." Nonetheless, it is widely
recognized that the exclusion under § 83 for an unfunded and
unsecured promise to pay was intended to preserve the well-
developed body of case law and administrative rulings govern-
ing the tax treatment of deferred payment obligations under
the cash method of accounting that preceded the enactment of
the statute. 10 5 As a result, the term "property" in § 83 should be
construed in such a manner so as to preserve this existing body
of law. The state of the law before § 83 therefore is critical to
understanding the scope of the limited exclusion from the stat-
ute's definition of property.
A. GENERAL CASH METHOD PRINCIPLES
Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of ac-
counting, a taxpayer realizes income upon the receipt of cash,
property, or services. 0 6 The definition of property for this pur-
pose has been construed extremely broadly to include all tangi-
ble and intangible property, regardless of whether the property
is illiquid or does not have a readily ascertainable fair market
value.1 07 The one caveat to this broad conception of property
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
105. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS 5.02(1), at 5-6 n.20 (3d ed. 1997).
It seems clear that unfunded and unsecured rights to future payment
were excluded from the § 83 definition of "property" to prevent § 83
from swallowing the cash method of accounting and thereby subject-
ing traditional nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements to
immediate taxation. As broadly applicable as it is, § 83 was not in-
tended to supplant the substantial body of law governing deferred
compensation arrangements.
Id. (citations omitted); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 51, 60.4.2, at
60-41 ("The exclusion of unfunded and unsecured promises preserves the long-
standing principle that these commitments are not taxed when made to em-
ployees and contractors using the cash method of accounting.").
106. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1997).
107. 4 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 105.3.2, at 105-48 (2d ed. 1992) ("[A] taxpayer
receiving an automobile or share of stock as compensation for services must
include its fair market value in income for the year of receipt, not some later
time when the automobile may be converted into cash by a sale.").
20051 1111
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
concerns a taxpayer's receipt of vested 108 contractual rights to
future payments. Common examples of these rights would in-
clude trade account receivables and rights to wages for past-
performed services. Though it is abundantly clear that such
payment rights constitute property under state law, that fact
does not conclusively determine that such rights constitute
property for purposes of federal taxation.
The essential issue thus is whether deferred payment obli-
gations are treated as property under the cash method. If so,
then the receipt of an obligation to pay would trigger immedi-
ate taxation. 0 9 If not, then only the receipt of a cash payment
pursuant to the obligation would trigger taxation.
The answer to this critical tax accounting issue has been
well-established in cases where the deferred payment obliga-
tion received by the service provider is one on which the service
recipient is the obligor-i.e., where the service provider has re-
ceived a second-party promise. In these cases, the receipt of the
promise does not trigger immediate tax consequences. As suc-
cinctly stated by the Board of Tax Appeals in the 1928 case of
Zittel v. Commissioner,11o "[t]axpayers on a [cash] receipts and
disbursements basis are required to report only income actually
received no matter how binding any contracts they may have to
receive more."'1 1
The clear purpose of this exception to the broad conception
of property is simply to keep the cash method separate from the
accrual method. 112 If a second-party promise constituted prop-
erty (and thus was immediately taxable) for cash method pur-
poses, then the creation of a standard trade account receivable
or a vested right to a payment of wages would give rise to cur-
108. By "vested," we mean that the right to payment is earned; in other
words, the right to payment is not contingent on the requirement that the tax-
payer perform any additional services or any other contingencies.
109. If the receipt of the promise were immediately taxable, the receipt of
cash pursuant to the promise would be treated as a recovery of after-tax dol-
lars (except to the extent of the interest portion).
110. 12 B.T.A. 675 (1928).
111. Id. at 677; see also Edwards v. Keith, 231 F. 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1916)
("[N]o instructions of the Treasury Department can enlarge the scope of this
statute so as to impose the income tax upon unpaid charges for services ren-
dered ...."); United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 269 F. 458, 459-60
(W.D. La. 1920) ("[W]here the effect of the transaction is a mere promise to
pay, and not an actual payment, it cannot be said to be income, until it has
been actually received, and is not subject to be taxed as such until its actual
receipt.").
112. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 51, 60.2.1, at 60-3 to 60-17.
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rent taxation, which is contrary to the core principles of cash
method accounting. Indeed, such a rule would functionally
eliminate the fundamental distinction between the cash and
accrual methods of accounting, thereby placing every taxpayer
on the accrual method.
The notion that, by immediately taxing second-party prom-
ises, the cash method would merge into the accrual method is a
critical one for the argument in this Article. In any service ar-
rangement, a payment obligation automatically arises once the
contract services have been performed-at that time, no further
action by the parties is required to create the service provider's
legal right to payment. As the right to income accrues upon the
creation of the payment obligation, the transaction generates
tax consequences under the accrual method of accounting.
1 13
However, under cash method principles, accounting for these
transactions awaits the payment of cash pursuant to the pay-
ment obligation. To keep these methods separate, ordinary sec-
ond-party promises cannot constitute property for cash method
purposes.
B. CASH EQUIVALENCY DOCTRINE
Although receipt of a second-party promise to pay gener-
ally does not trigger immediate taxation under the cash
method, two important exceptions exist. The first exception in-
volves cases where the courts have determined that a second-
party promise is the functional equivalent of cash and therefore
immediately taxable upon receipt. The leading case that has
applied this "cash equivalency" doctrine is the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Cowden v. Commissioner.
1 14
In Cowden, the taxpayer executed a mineral lease in favor
of an oil company in 1951. Through supplemental agreements
executed along with the lease, the oil company agreed to make
113. Under the accrual method of accounting, income is generally included
"for the taxable year when all events have occurred that fix the right to receive
the income and the amount of the income can be determined with reasonable
accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1997). On the de-
duction side, an obligation to pay automatically arises when services have
been performed for the benefit of the taxpayer. If such an obligation to pay
were treated as "property" for cash method purposes, the deduction would be
allowed when the services were performed-the same time as under the ac-
crual method, which generally allows deductions when all events have oc-
curred that fix the obligation to pay and the amount of the obligation can be
determined with reasonable accuracy. See id.
114. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
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certain "bonus" payments to the taxpayer in the approximate
aggregate amount of $500,000, $250,000 due in 1952 and the
remaining $250,000 due in 1953.115 The oil company's deferred
payment obligations were unconditional; they did not depend
on any rate of production or even on the oil company's contin-
ued ownership of the leasehold interest.11 6 Later in 1951, the
taxpayer assigned the 1952 bonus payment to a bank (of which
the taxpayer was a director) for a discount that implied interest
at the prevailing market rate.n1 7 Similarly, in 1952, the tax-
payer assigned the bonus payments due in 1953 to the bank at
a similar discount. 118
The Tax Commissioner determined that the fair market
value of the bonus payments was properly included in the tax-
payer's gross income for 1951, the year in which the obligations
were received. 119 The Fifth Circuit agreed with this approach.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that only a nego-
tiable instrument could be taxed as a cash equivalent, reason-
ing as follows:
A promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily the equiva-
lent of cash. Such an instrument may have been issued by a maker of
doubtful solvency or for other reasons such paper might be denied a
ready acceptance in the market place. We think the converse of this
principle ought to be applicable. We are convinced that if a promise to
pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and assignable, not subject to
set-offs, and is of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or
investors at a discount not substantially greater than the generally
prevailing premium for the use of money, such promise is the equiva-
lent of cash and taxable in the like manner as cash would have been
taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather than the obliga-
tion.12
0
Thus, under the cash equivalency doctrine, the receipt of a sec-
ond-party promise to pay that can be readily liquidated can
give rise to current taxation under the cash method.121
115. Id. at 21.
116. Id. at 22.
117. Id.
118. Id. The taxpayer's apparent goal in structuring the transaction in this
manner was not only to defer taxation of the bonus payments, but also to at-
tempt to convert ordinary income into long-term capital gain. See id.
119. Id. Because the payment obligations were not interest bearing, the
Tax Commissioner applied a 4% discount in determining the present value ob-
ligation to be included in gross income upon receipt. Id.
120. Id. at 24 (footnotes omitted).
121. Although the Cowden decision arose in the context of a lease of prop-
erty, its reasoning is equally applicable to the receipt of a promise to pay for
services rendered.
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Cowden may appear to suggest that the fundamental justi-
fication for the cash method's ordinary nontaxation of second-
party promises relates to the general illiquidity of such prom-
ises. However, the precepts of the cash method of accounting
cannot be explained in terms of liquidity.122 The receipt of
property that cannot be readily liquidated- (e.g., stock in a
closely held corporation, undeveloped real property) nonethe-
less gives rise to current taxation under the cash method. The
lack of a market on which property can be readily disposed does
not bear on the timing of inclusion; rather, to the extent facts
relating to the liquidity of the property have any relevance at
all, they bear on the measure of inclusion. 123
The cash equivalency doctrine is best understood as a very
narrow exception to the general rule that a second-party prom-
ise is not taxable upon receipt under the cash method. By im-
mediately taxing promises to pay that can be readily liquidated
to cash, the doctrine is consistent with the principle that the
receipt of cash is always taxable. Because of the rarity of com-
pensatory promises that could be readily liquidated, such
treatment does not impinge unduly on the traditional scope of
the cash method.
122. Rather, the deferred taxation of second-party promises to pay under
the cash method is best understood as a concession to simplicity. By ordinarily
delaying taxation until actual cash receipt on these very common promises,
the cash method avoids the complexities associated with: (a) determining pre-
cisely when a right to payment accrues; (b) valuing the right to payment; and
(c) reconciling the cash amount actually received (if any) with the amount pre-
viously included in income. While it is true that the realization event under
the cash method often coincides with a liquidity event, this is properly consid-
ered an incidental benefit of the cash method-not the driving force behind the
cash method-because it is clear that the receipt of illiquid property does trig-
ger immediate taxation. See infra note 125. Another incidental benefit to the
cash method is that the typical individual taxpayer might not conceive that he
has realized income until the taxpayer receives actual cash payment pursuant
to a compensatory promise to pay. Cf. Terrence R. Chorvat, Perception and In-
come: The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REV.
75 (2003) (discussing behavioral economics research suggesting that people
whose property appreciates do not view themselves as wealthier until the
property is liquidated into cash). The cash method therefore comports with
and, perhaps, reinforces this unsophisticated view.
123. Fair market value is generally defined as "the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither be-
ing under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965). Issues
of liquidity frequently factor into the determination of fair market value under
this standard.
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C. ECONOMIC BENEFIT DOCTRINE
The second exception to the rule that the receipt of second-
party promises does not give rise to immediate taxation in-
volves the so-called "economic benefit" doctrine. 124 Consistent
with the notion that liquidity concerns do not underscore the
cash method of accounting, courts have developed this doctrine
to tax individuals on vested benefits that they could not cur-
rently reduce to cash or otherwise currently consume. While
the economic benefit doctrine is best known for its application
to "funded" second-party promises to pay, the doctrine has its
origins in cases involving third-party promises. The origin and
development of the economic benefit doctrine are discussed be-
low.
1. Third-Party Promises To Pay
While the precise origin of the economic benefit doctrine is
debatable, 125 the doctrine first appeared to take shape in the
1942 Tax Court case of Brodie v. Commissioner.126 The Brodie
case concerned a bonus program implemented by Procter &
Gamble for the benefit of its executives. 127 Bonuses in the early
years were paid in cash. 128 However, in the taxable year at is-
sue, the bonuses took the form of a single-premium annuity
purchased by the employer and delivered to the employee.1 29
Payments on each annuity were to start when the employee-
annuitant attained age seventy.1 30 The employees could not
124. For detailed discussions of the economic benefit doctrine, see Gordon
T. Butler, Economic Benefit: Formulating a Workable Theory of Income Recog-
nition, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 70 (1996); John F. Cooper, The Economic Bene-
fit Doctrine: How an Unconditional Right to a Future Benefit Can Cause a
Current Tax Detriment, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 217 (1988).
125. Many commentators consider the Supreme Court decision in Commis-
sioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), to be the source of the economic benefit
doctrine. See Cooper, supra note 124, at 221; Patricia Ann Metzer, Construc-
tive Receipt, Economic Benefit and Assignment of Income: A Case Study in De-
ferred Compensation, 29 TAx L. REV. 525, 550 (1974). In this case, the Su-
preme Court reasoned that the general statutory rule of inclusion "is broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit con-
ferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which
it is effected." Smith, 324 U.S. at 181 (citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r,
279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929)).
126. 1 T.C. 275 (1942).
127. Id. at 276-77.
128. Id. at 277.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 278.
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surrender the annuity for cash, nor could they assign their
rights in the annuity or any payment due thereunder. 131
The employees who received the paid-up annuities took the
position that the receipt of the annuity did not trigger immedi-
ate taxation, arguing instead that they should be taxed only
when cash payments were received pursuant to the annuity. 132
To support their argument, the employees stressed that they
did not have free use of the funds expended to acquire the an-
nuity and further that the annuity contracts could not be as-
signed or surrendered. 133 In short, the employees argued that
the purchase and delivery of the annuity contracts conferred no
presently taxable benefit on them. 134 The Tax Court disagreed:
[W]hile we do not think that the doctrine of constructive receipt as it
is commonly understood can be correctly applied in these proceedings,
it is undoubtedly true that the amount which the Commissioner has
included in each petitioner's income was used for his benefit, albeit
not at his own direction, in the purchase of an annuity contract, and
the contract so purchased was issued in the name of the annuitant
and was delivered to him and was part of the plan for his additional
remuneration. 1
35
After noting the absence of any restrictions or conditions on the
annuity relating to taxpayer's continued employment with the
company, the court determined that the annuity premium was
properly included in each employee's gross income for the year
in which the annuity was delivered to the employee. 136
Shortly after the Brodie decision, the same issue was ad-
dressed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States
v. Drescher.137 The taxpayer in Drescher was an executive of
Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, which had implemented a
plan to provide for the voluntary retirement of its principal offi-
131. Id. The employer went to some length to find an insurance company
who would write a contract containing these restrictions, without which the
employer would not have purchased the annuity. Id. at 279. Because of the re-
striction on assignment, the receipt of the annuity would not trigger the cash
equivalency doctrine.
132. The doctrine of constructive receipt was not implicated in the case be-
cause the taxpayer had no discretion over the manner in which the bonus was
to be paid. Specifically, the taxpayer could not elect to receive cash in lieu of
the paid-up annuity policy. Id.
133. Id. at 282.
134. Id. at 276.
135. Id. at 281-82.
136. Id. at 284.
137. 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
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cers. 138 Pursuant to this plan and in each of the taxable years
at issue, the company purchased a $5,000 single-premium, non-
forfeitable annuity contract naming the taxpayer as the annui-
tant.139 Although the company maintained physical possession
of the annuity contract, the taxpayer was irrevocably desig-
nated as the annuitant and the taxpayer possessed the exclu-
sive rights over the designation of the beneficiary to receive
payments upon his death. 140 The terms of the annuity provided
that the taxpayer could not assign the annuity contract or any
payment due thereunder.141 Furthermore, the annuity carried
no cash surrender or loan value. 142
The company deducted the $5,000 cost of the annuity in
the year of purchase, whereas the taxpayer claimed that he did
not realize any income on account of the annuity until cash
payments were received pursuant to the contract. 143 In rela-
tively short order, the Second Circuit concluded that the em-
ployer's purchase of the annuity generated current tax conse-
quences to the taxpayer: "It cannot be doubted that.., the
plaintiff received as compensation for prior services something
of economic benefit which he had not previously had, namely,
the obligation of the insurance company to pay money in the fu-
ture to him or his designated beneficiaries . . . ,"144 The balance
of the opinion was devoted to determining the proper measure
of inclusion, wherein the court rejected the taxpayer's claim
that the inability to assign the annuity rendered it valueless. 145
138. Id. at 863-64.
139. Id. at 864.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. (providing details of the annuity contract at issue). However,
the starting date of the annuity payments could be accelerated at the election
of the annuitant, provided the election was endorsed on the policy by the in-
surance company. Id. Because the company maintained physical possession of
the annuities, the taxpayer in this case could not unilaterally elect to acceler-
ate the annuity start date. Id. at 866.
143. Id. at 864-65.
144. Id. at 865. The Drescher court's use of the phrase "economic benefit" in
this context is potentially misleading. It is clear that all promises to pay made
by a solvent obligor, whether issued by a second party or third party, confer an
economic or financial benefit upon their holder. However, solely to keep the
cash and accrual methods separate, courts engage in the fiction that second-
party promises do not provide any economic or financial benefit to their hold-
ers.
145. See id. However, the court did recognize that the taxpayer could have
established a taxable value of the annuity lower than the premium paid by the
employer, because the employer's retention of physical possession of the policy
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Though not explicit in their analyses, the Brodie and Dre-
scher courts established a critical distinction between a second-
party promise to pay (that is, one made by the service recipient)
and a promise to pay received from a third party to the service
transaction (for example, one made by an insurance com-
pany).146 In the former context, the receipt of the contractual
obligation does not give rise to current taxation except in the
rare case that the promise is sufficiently liquid to be character-
ized as a cash equivalent. However, if the service recipient fur-
nishes the service provider with a third-party promise, that
promise-regardless of its liquidity or lack thereof-is always
regarded as "property" for purposes of the cash method. 147 Ac-
cordingly, these authorities establish that the receipt of a com-
pensatory promise to pay issued by a third party is currently
taxable to the service provider to the extent of the fair market
value of the promise.
prevented the taxpayer from exercising the option under the contract to accel-
erate the annuity starting date. See id. at 865-66.
146. As one commentator put it, "This rule dates from the dawn of federal
tax law," WHITE, supra note 23, at A-64 n.764, pointing to the 1920 case of
United States v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 269 F. 458 (W.D. La. 1920). Although
Christine Oil involved a deferred payment obligation issued in exchange for
the sale of property, the district court analogized the issue to payment obliga-
tions issued in exchange for services in the following manner:
What is... said of unpaid services applies with equal force to unpaid
purchase money. If a seller accepts the notes of third persons in abso-
lute payment, the rule would be different. But where the effect of the
transaction is a mere promise to pay, and not actual payment, it can-
not be said to be income, until it has been actually received, and is not
subject to be taxed as such until its actual receipt.
Id. at 459-60 (emphasis added).
One may argue that the decisions in Brodie and Drescher, which each ad-
dressed annuity contracts issued by insurance companies, do not provide much
in the way of guidance on the broader issue of how third-party promises to pay
should be taxed on the cash method due to the virtual certainty that the pay-
ments called for under the annuity contracts would be made. Yet, an annuity
contract of the sort at issue in Brodie and Drescher represents nothing more
than the insurance company's promise to pay the annuitant a periodic sum in
the future, a promise that is neither funded by a particular pool of assets nor
secured by property. Thus, an annuity contract can be appropriately described
as an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in the future. See Childs
v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634, 651-53 (1994) (holding that annuity contracts nam-
ing the taxpayer as beneficiary were unfunded and unsecured promises to
pay). Rather than bearing on the timing of inclusion, the low-risk nature of the
annuity is relevant in determining the measure of inclusion.
147. See Cooper, supra note 124, at 237 (noting that the doctrine of cash
equivalency has no application where a promise of a third party is trans-
ferred).
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2. Funded Second-Party Promises To Pay
While the economic benefit doctrine operated in Brodie and
Drescher to tax the employee upon the receipt of third-party
promises to pay that were purchased by the employer, the doc-
trine is not limited to this context alone. The Tax Court in
McEwen v. Commissioner148 illustrated that the doctrine also
applied to second-party promises that the service recipient had
irrevocably funded.
The employer in McEwen promised to pay one of its execu-
tives a specified percentage of the employer's profits.149 Pursu-
ant to this compensation arrangement, the employer annually
funded its promise to pay by depositing the requisite profit-
sharing amount in a trust created for the employee's benefit.1 50
The funding of the trust by the employer was irrevocable-the
trust agreement provided that no part of the trust estate could,
under any circumstances, revert to or in any way inure to the
benefit of the employer.151 Accordingly, the corpus was not sub-
ject to the claims of the employer's creditors.1 52 In addition, the
trust agreement contained spendthrift provisions that pre-
cluded the employee from assigning his beneficial interest in
the trust, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. 153
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Smith,1 54 the Tax Court determined that tax consequences of
the transaction turned on the following question: "[W]as 'any
economic or financial benefit conferred upon the employee as
148. 6 T.C. 1018 (1946).
149. See id. at 1019.
150. See id. at 1021-23. The trust agreement provided that the trustee
would use the trust asset to purchase government bonds or to purchase single-
premium annuity contracts, payments on which would commence when the
executive attained age sixty. See id. at 1021.
151. See id. at 1023.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. 324 U.S. 177 (1945). In Smith, the Supreme Court addressed the tax
consequences of an employee's exercise of compensatory stock option prior to
the enactment of § 83. The Court held that even though parties stipulated that
the option had no value when it was issued to the taxpayer, the taxpayer real-
ized compensation income when the option was exercised to the extent the fair
market value of the stock received exceeded the exercise price. See id. at 180-
82. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the general statutory
rule of inclusion "is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or
financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the
form or mode by which it is effected." Id. at 181 (citing Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929)).
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compensation' in the taxable year?"155 The Tax Court resolved
this question in the affirmative by holding that the employee
was properly taxed on the amounts paid into the trust at the
time of such funding. 156 In doing so, the Tax Court placed con-
siderable emphasis on the fact that the trust estate could not
revert back to the employer. 15 7 Accordingly, the McEwen case
established that the economic benefit doctrine applied when the
service recipient created a separate fund to provide for the fu-
ture benefit of the taxpayer, so long as the transfer of money or
property into the fund was irrevocable-meaning that the fund
assets could never be paid to or for the benefit of the trans-
feror. 158
The Tax Court's opinion in McEwen laid the foundation for
its decision in Sproull v. Commissioner,15 9 the case most com-
monly associated with the economic benefit doctrine. In
Sproull, the employer deposited $10,500 in a trust for the bene-
fit of its employee near the end of 1945.160 The trust terms pro-
vided that half of the initial trust principal would be distrib-
uted to the employee in 1946, with the balance of the trust
estate being distributed in 1947.161 In Sproull the Tax Court
considered whether the employee was required to include the
$10,500 in gross income in the taxable year in which the em-
ployer funded the trust, or whether the employee could defer
taxation until cash payments were received from the trust.
162
In resolving the issue of whether taxation could be de-
ferred, the Tax Court again started with the question of
whether any economic benefit had been conferred upon the em-
ployee in the year the trust was created. 163 The court noted that
the trust principal was fixed and irrevocably paid out for the
employee's benefit in that year and that the employee did not
155. McEwen, 6 T.C. at 1026 (quoting Smith, 324 U.S. at 181).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Cooper, supra note 124, at 232-33 (enumerating the requirements
of the economic benefit doctrine).
159. 16 T.C. 244 (1951).
160. See id. at 245.
161. See id. Although the employee in the case served as president of the
corporate employer, the trust arrangement was neither initiated by the em-
ployee nor taken pursuant to his direction. Thus, the employee could not be
viewed as having constructively received the amount used to fund the trust in
1945. See id. at 246.
162. See id. at 245.
163. See id. at 247.
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have to perform any further obligations to establish or main-
tain his rights under the trust. 164 Under these facts, the court
concluded that in 1945 the employee possessed a "vested valu-
able interest in the trust fund" that warranted current taxa-
tion. 165
Following McEwen, Sproull, and other similar cases, the
IRS laid out its approach to the taxation of compensatory prom-
ises to pay under the cash method by addressing a variety of
deferred payment scenarios in Revenue Ruling 60-31.166 In ex-
amples 1 and 2 of the ruling where the deferred payment obli-
gation consisted only of a contractual obligation on the part of
the employer to pay compensation to the employee in the fu-
ture, the IRS concluded that the receipt of the promise did not
constitute a current taxable event. 167 Rather, the IRS acknowl-
edged that "[a] mere promise to pay, not represented by notes
or secured in any way, is not regarded as a receipt of income
within the meaning of the cash receipts and disbursements
method."168 In this manner, the IRS simply reiterated the rule
164. See id.
165. Id. at 248. Despite its close association with the economic benefit doc-
trine, the Sproull decision is not the strongest authority for the doctrine.
Unlike the trust at issue in McEwen, the trust agreement in Sproull contained
no restriction on the employee's ability to assign his beneficial interest
therein. Given that the trust principal was being held by a corporate trust
company, the result in Sproull could just as easily have been justified in terms
of the cash equivalency doctrine. See Butler, supra note 124, at 87 n.90 (noting
that some commentators view Sproull as a cash equivalence case).
166. 1960-1 C.B. 174. This ruling has been characterized as the "fountain-
head of learning on the subject of nonqualified deferred compensation."
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 51, 60.2.1, at 60-3.
167. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178-79 (holdings in examples 1 and
2).
168. Id. at 177 (citations omitted). The IRS's articulation of the rule ex-
empting second-party payment obligations from current taxation introduced
some new concepts. First, the ruling made a distinction between promises that
are not evidenced by promissory notes and those that are. While the bright-
line rule of treating any promise to pay that is memorialized in a promissory
note as currently taxable comports with Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) (1957),
which provides that "[niotes or other evidences of indebtedness received in
payment for services constitute income in the amount of their fair market
value at the time of the transfer," the bright-line rule is not consistent with
the cash equivalency doctrine as articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Cowden.
See Cowden v. Comm'r, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating that a promis-
sory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily a cash equivalent that war-
rants current taxation). Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(4) can be reconciled with the
Cowden decision only if the scope of the regulation is limited to promissory
notes that constitute cash equivalents under the Cowden test. See A. THOMAS
BRISENDINE ET AL., DEFERRED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS, at A-37 (BNA
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that the receipt of a mere second-party promise did not result
in immediate taxation.
169
However, consistent with the economic benefit doctrine,
the IRS ruled that a funded second-party promise was immedi-
ately taxable. In example 4 of the ruling, the employer paid a
signing bonus of $150x to an escrow agent pursuant to an
agreement that called for the agent to distribute such amount
in installments over five years. 170 If the taxpayer died prior to
the five-year term, the remaining payments were to be made to
his estate. 171 Citing Sproull, the IRS concluded that the $150x
bonus constituted income to the taxpayer in the year in which
the employer unconditionally placed such amount in escrow.
172
3. Reconciling the Economic Benefit Cases
Upon close reflection, it is apparent that the two strands of
economic benefit doctrine cases-purchased third-party prom-
ises versus funded second-party promises-do not differ in any
meaningful respect. In Brodie and Drescher, the service recipi-
ent compensated its service provider by purchasing an annuity
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 385-4th, 2002) (suggesting this interpretation).
The statement in Rev. Rul. 60-31 also introduced the notion that the re-
ceipt of a promise to pay that was "secured in any way" was not entitled to de-
ferral. The precise origin of this requirement is unclear, as it was not ex-
pressly mentioned in the economic-benefit cases that the ruling cites.
However, the identical phrase appeared in United States v. Christine Oil &
Gas Co., 269 F. 458 (W.D. La. 1920), where the court held that the deferred
payment obligations therein, described as "not represented by notes or secured
in any way," were not taxable upon receipt. Id. at 458. Although the authority
for, and meaning of, the requirement that the obligation not be secured in any
way is not clear, the requirement is consistent with the holdings of McEwen
and Sproull, wherein the taxpayers had elevated their status above that of a
general unsecured creditor of the service recipient.
169. A similar rule concerning second-party promises to pay was later ar-
ticulated by the Tax Court in Centre v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 16, 19-20
(1970):
The naked promise of an employer to pay compensation at some fu-
ture date for services currently rendered is not income to a cash basis
employee. This is true even where the employer currently procures
insurance on the life of the employee to fund future compensation
payments. Where the insurance remains an asset of the employer to
which all creditors have rights and the employee acquires no immedi-
ate rights thereto, he realizes no income from the payment of premi-
ums on the insurance.
Id.
170. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 176-77.
171. Id. at 177.
172. Id. at 180.
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that irrevocably obligated a third-party insurance company to
make payments to the employee. In McEwen and Sproull, the
service recipient funded its obligation to pay the service pro-
vider by transferring assets to a trust or escrow account. Thus,
in both lines of cases, the service provider's right to future pay-
ments emanates from a third party such that the right was not
subject to the service recipient's bankruptcy or insolvency
risk.173 The only distinction between the two lines of cases re-
lates to the extent to which the third party is a passive invest-
ment vehicle that can be viewed as an agent or extension of the
service recipient, as opposed to an active business entity wholly
unrelated to the service recipient. Yet regardless of how one la-
bels or distinguishes between the various economic benefit
cases, one critical fact is common to all: the service provider's
right to payment is insulated from the risk of the service recipi-
ent's subsequent insolvency or bankruptcy.
The government itself may view these two strands of eco-
nomic benefit cases as overlapping. In Revenue Ruling 69-50,174
the IRS addressed the tax consequences of a physician's receipt
of a deferred payment obligation from a health insurer in con-
sideration for services performed for the benefit of an insured
patient. These promises were not funded in any manner
through the use of a trust or escrow arrangement. Neverthe-
less, the IRS ruled that the physician was immediately taxable
on the fair market value of this promise, focusing on the fact
that the physician's right to payment from the insurer "ema-
nate[d] from the medical services that he has rendered to [the
patient] .175
This conclusion would appear to be supported simply by
the principle set forth in Brodie and Drescher that third-party
promises are property per se for purposes of the cash method.
However, in reaching its conclusion, the IRS used language
suggesting that it believed that the insurer's promises consti-
tuted funded promises, asserting: "In effect, [the patients] have
funded their obligations to the participating physician with the
corporation, and, in so doing, they have conferred an economic
or financial benefit on the participating physician."' 76 Fur-
173. In other words, the promise to pay is made by someone other than the
service recipient. Therefore, if the service recipient thereafter became insol-
vent, it would have no impact on the likelihood of payment.
174. 1969-1 C.B. 140.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
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thermore, the ruling cited to McEwen and Sproul, the famous
funded promise cases, in addition to the classic third-party
promise cases of Brodie and Drescher.177
Revenue Ruling 69-50 thus suggests that the government
may consider any compensatory promise that provides the ser-
vice provider with a right to payment that would not be af-
fected by the bankruptcy or insolvency of the service recipient
to be a "funded" promise, regardless of whether the payments
will emanate from a separate business entity as opposed to a
trust or escrow account. Courts, on the other hand, appear to be
of the view that promises made by third-party business entities
are per se property as opposed to funded promises. The issue,
however, is purely semantic. Regardless of the labels employed,
a service provider's contractual right to payment that is not
subject to the credit risk of the service recipient is considered
property under the cash method and, as such, is taxable upon
receipt. 178
III. TAXING THE PROMISE TO PAY UNDER SECTION 83
A. DEFINITION OF PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 83
The previous part illustrated that, under the economic
benefit doctrine, third-party promises or funded second-party
promises constitute property for purposes of the cash method
and therefore are immediately taxable when received. The
question then arises whether the enactment of § 83 in 1969 has
any impact on this conclusion. This section by its terms explic-
itly deals with compensatory transfers of "property."'179 Does
the statute's conception of property simply incorporate existing
law regarding the definition of property for cash method pur-
poses or was its enactment intended somehow to change this
view?
Because § 83 does not define the term property, it can be
inferred that Congress intended that the existing definition of
property, as clarified through years of case law and government
177. Id.
178. In other words, under either view, a compensatory promise to pay that
would be unaffected by the service provider's bankruptcy or insolvency (either
because the obligor is a different party altogether or because the service pro-
vider has "funded" its obligation through the use of an escrow or trust vehicle)
constitutes property under the cash method and, therefore, is taxable upon
receipt.
179. I.R.C. § 83 (2000).
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rulings, applied. There is no indication whatsoever in the stat-
ute or its legislative history that, by enacting § 83 to deal with
unvested property, Congress intended to overturn or upset
long-standing court decisions such as Brodie, Drescher, McE-
wen, and Sproull, or the highly influential Revenue Ruling 60-
31. To the contrary, the statute is best understood as codifying
this existing law, because the statute itself builds upon this
conception of property. 180
Consistent with the notion that § 83 codified the well-
established case law and government rulings defining property
for cash method purposes, the regulations promulgated by the
Treasury in 1978 defined the term as follows:
For purposes of § 83 and the regulations thereunder, the term "prop-
erty" includes real and personal property other than money or an un-
funded and unsecured promise to pay money in the future. The term
also includes a beneficial interest in assets (including money) which
are transferred or set aside from the claims of creditors of the trans-
feror .... 181
180. See supra note 105. In particular, § 83 was viewed as codifying the
common law economic benefit doctrine. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-36-001 (May
12, 1993) ("Section 83 of the Code is generally believed to be a codification of
the economic benefit doctrine as it applies to transfers of property as remu-
neration for services."); Constance M. Hiatt, Nonqualified Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans, SJ013 ALI-ABA 457, 468 (2003) (describing § 83 as "the Code's re-
flection of the economic benefit doctrine"); Metzer, supra note 125, at 552("Section 83 both codifies and expands the common law notions of economic
benefit as they relate to property transferred in connection with the perform-
ance of services."). Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation in 1978 specifi-
cally providing that the taxation of private deferred compensation arrange-
ments was to be determined "in accordance with principles set forth in
regulations, rulings, and judicial decisions relating to deferred compensation
which were in effect on February 1, 1978." Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-600, § 132(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2782. In that regard, the final regulations un-
der § 83 were not published until July 24, 1978. See T.D. 7554, 43 Fed. Reg.
31,911 (July 24, 1978).
181. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978). When the regulations interpreting § 83 were
first issued in proposed form earlier in 1971, property was defined broadly to
include "both reality and personality other than money and other than an un-
funded and unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation." Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-3(e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,791 (June 3, 1971). While the definition of
property contained in the final regulation was altered to avoid reliance on the
sometimes vague notion of deferred compensation, the reference to deferred
compensation in the first proposed regulation evidenced the Treasury's view
that the exception to property for purposes of § 83 was limited to deferred
payment obligations issued by the service recipient.
After the final regulation was promulgated, questions were raised regard-
ing whether an unsecured and unfunded promise to pay something other than
money in the future gave rise to current taxation under § 83. See William L.
Sollee, Final Section 83 Regs Will Have Major Impact on Compensatory Prop-
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The themes of the common law conception of property are ap-
parent in this definition. The first sentence of the definition
provides an extremely broad definition of property, appearing
to carve out only mere promises to pay that would not be cap-
tured by the economic benefit doctrine. The second sentence
seems redundant in that the beneficial interest to which it re-
fers would appear to constitute a funded promise. Nevertheless,
the sentence shows the Treasury's intent to incorporate eco-
nomic benefit notions-pursuant to which the service provider,
to achieve deferral, would be required to remain a general un-
secured creditor of the service recipient-in the definition.
This regulatory definition of property, however, is not per-
fectly drafted. Its terms, interpreted literally, leave the door
ajar for an argument that an unfunded and unsecured promise
of a third party does not constitute property under § 83. If so,
the receipt of such a promise by a cash method taxpayer would
not be immediately taxable; rather the taxpayer would pay tax
only as cash was received pursuant to the promise. This argu-
ment is analyzed below.
B. TAXATION OF THIRD-PARTY PROMISES UNDER SECTION 83
Having explored the origin and development of the eco-
nomic benefit doctrine, the codification of such doctrine in § 83,
and the regulatory definition of "property" for purposes of that
statute, we can now address the proper tax treatment of com-
pensatory third-party promises under current law. Although
the exclusion from the definition of property under Treasury
Regulation § 1.83-3(e) for an "unfunded and unsecured promise
to pay money or property in the future" can be read literally to
cover any and all such promises to pay, whether issued by the
service recipient or some external third party, the conclusion
that the exclusion is limited to promises issued by the service
recipient is virtually inescapable.1 8 2
Consistent with the notion that § 83 was not intended to
upset the traditional conception of property that had been ex-
tensively developed by courts and government rulings, the en-
erty Payments, 49 J. TAX'N 258, 258-59 (1978). Any such doubt was removed
by a clarifying amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) in 1985 that expanded
the exclusion to an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay "money or prop-
erty" in the future. See T.D. 8042, 1985-2 C.B. 30-31 (amending Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e)).
182. See infra Part IV.B. That being said, this fundamental distinction has
in fact escaped a number of courts.
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tire purpose behind the unfunded and unsecured promise ex-
clusion is to preserve the tax treatment of contractual deferred
payment obligations that existed prior to the enactment of§ 83.183 This pre-existing law clearly provided that, while mere
promises of the service recipient to pay were not immediately
taxable in the hands of a cash-method taxpayer (i.e., they were
not considered "property"), third-party promises always
were. 8 4 Thus, while the Treasury could have drafted a more
precise regulation by expressly limiting the exclusion to mere
promises of the service recipient, it is certainly understandable
that the Treasury would have thought such an express limita-
tion unnecessary. Based on years of case law and government
rulings, the limitation simply went without saying. 8 5
183. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.C.1.
185. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive De-ferred Compensation Plans, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 515-16 (2002) (rec-
ognizing implicitly that the unfunded and unsecured promise to pay must
emanate from the service recipient to be excluded from the § 83 definition of
property).
If the exclusion for an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay under Reg.
§ 1.83-3(e) could properly be interpreted as including a promise from a party
external to the service relationship, then Congress, aided by the Treasury,
would have unwittingly opened the floodgates on deferred compensation ar-
rangements beyond their already permissive bounds. A literal reading of
Regulation § 1.83-3(e) to encompass a third-party promise would allow defer-
ral where an employer compensates an employee by purchasing an annuity
from an insurance company and transferring it to an employee. Yet there is
nothing to indicate any intent on the part of Congress, in enacting § 83, to ex-
pand the bounds of deferred compensation by legislatively overruling Brodie,
Drescher, and their extensive progeny. To the contrary, Congress at the time
viewed the realm of deferred compensation as having already gotten out of
hand. In its report accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the House
commented as follows:
It is anomalous that the tax treatment of deferred compensation
should depend on whether the amount to be deferred is placed in a
trust or whether it is merely accumulated as a reserve on the books of
the employer corporation. An employee who receives additional com-
pensation in the form of a promise to pay him that compensation in
the future made by a large, financially sound corporation, is probably
as likely to receive the compensation as an employee whose deferred
compensation is placed in trust. Your committee believes that the
possibility of shifting income to taxable years after retirement when
the marginal tax bracket is expected to be lower should not be avail-
able to employees who are in a position to bargain for deferred com-
pensation arrangements and to rely on the unsecured obligation of
their employers, when such benefits are not available to other em-
ployees.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1738. If
Congress was troubled by the deferred taxation of a second-party promise to
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A revenue ruling issued by the IRS contemporaneously
with the promulgation of the § 83 regulations (seven years after
§ 83 was enacted) confirms this view. In the ruling, 86 the IRS
addressed virtually the same factual scenario it had previously
analyzed in Revenue Ruling 69-50,187 namely whether a physi-
cian who renders services to a patient is currently taxed upon
the receipt of a promise to pay issued by the patient's insurer.
The only additional fact in Revenue Ruling 77-420 was that the
physician's right to future payment from the corporation was
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.18 8 In concluding that
the inclusion of a substantial risk of forfeiture did not operate
to defer taxation of the payment obligations from the corpora-
tion beyond their receipt, the ruling reasoned as follows:
The conclusion of Rev. Rul. 69-50 is based on the fact that the physi-
cian's income arises out of the physician's acquisition from the patient
of a right to payment from the corporation. Because the agreement
between the corporation and the physician is independent of the deal-
ings between the patient and the physician, the inclusion of a sub-
stantial forfeiture provision in the agreement does not alter the rela-
tionship by which the patient-subscriber has conferred an economic or
financial benefit on the physician.18 9
Revenue Ruling 77-420 thus supports the view that the second-
party versus third-party distinction in determining the tax
treatment of deferred payment obligations retained its funda-
mental importance after § 83 was enacted.
C. POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS
In Part II we explained that prior to the enactment of § 83,
courts drew a distinction between second-party promises to
pay, which were not generally taxable upon receipt, and third-
party promises to pay, which were. Thus far in Part III, we
have argued that this disparate tax treatment was codified by
the enactment of § 83 and its definition of property as articu-
lated in Treasury Regulation § 1.83-3(e). This subpart ad-
dresses the possible counterarguments to this view.
pay from a financially sound employer, then surely it had no intention of ex-
panding the instances of deferral to promises to pay from third-party insur-
ance companies.
186. Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172.
187. For a discussion of Revenue Ruling 69-50, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 174-80.
188. Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172, 173.
189. Id.
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1. Use of the Term "Transferor" in the Section 83 Regulations
In addition to relying on an overly literal reading of the un-
funded and unsecured promise exclusion in the § 83 regula-
tions, 190 some commentators have suggested that the sentence
immediately following the unfunded and unsecured clause in
Treasury Regulation § 1.83-3(e) supports the view that the
identity of the obligor of a promise is irrelevant. This sentence
provides: "The term [property] also includes a beneficial inter-
est in assets (including money) which are transferred or set
aside from the claims of creditors of the transferor, for example,
in a trust or escrow account."'191 According to these commenta-
tors, "the term 'transferor,' if taken literally, could refer not
only to service recipients but also to third parties that are in no
way related to either the service recipient or the executive."'192
This use of the term "transferor" rather than "service recipi-
ent," the argument goes, suggests that the regulation is wholly
unconcerned with the identity of the party issuing the promis-
ing to pay.
This argument is unconvincing. When third-party promises
are made in connection with services, it is always the service
recipient who in substance transfers the promise, even if, as a
strictly formal matter, the third-party promise is delivered di-
rectly to the service provider. Simply put, the third-party obli-
gor has no relationship with the service provider, and is clearly
issuing its promise to pay on behalf of, and at the direction of,
the service recipient. The term transferor in the regulation thus
will always refer to the service recipient. 193
190. For a rebuttal of the argument that Reg. § 1.83-3(e) should be inter-
preted in this literal manner, see supra text accompanying notes 182-89.
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985) (emphasis added).
192. Selling Stock Options, supra note 9, at 99.
193. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (holding
that where employer discharges its employee's debt, it is treated as if payment
was made directly to the employee, who then discharges his own debt). Fur-
ther support for this proposition is found in other § 83 regulations. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.83-6(d)(1) provides that, if a shareholder of a corporation transfers prop-
erty to the corporation's service provider in connection with the performance of
services for the corporation, the transaction should be treated as a capital con-
tribution of the property by the shareholder to the corporation followed by a
compensatory transfer of the property to the service provider by the corpora-
tion. Therefore, even though the shareholder formally makes the compensa-
tory transfer, the corporation/service recipient is properly treated as the trans-
feror of the property to the service provider for tax purposes.
However, some might argue that the last sentence of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
1(a), which provides that § 83 applies to compensatory transfers even where
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For instance, in the Brodie case, it appears that the annu-
ity contracts purchased by the employer were issued directly to
the employees. 194 Despite the fact that the annuities were tech-
nically transferred by the insurance company to the employees,
the court concluded that the employer, through the purchase of
the annuities, had provided the employees additional compen-
sation. Accordingly, the employer was viewed as the transferor
of the promise even though it was not the obligor under such
promise. Any argument that the term "transferor" as used in
Treasury Regulation § 1.83-3(e) supports the view that third-
party promises do not constitute property is thus misguided.
2. Case Law Supporting Deferred Taxation of Third-Party
Promises
In addition to relying on the literal text of the § 83 regula-
tions, some commentators have pointed to the Tax Court case
of Childs v. Commissioner195 to support the notion that naked
third-party promises do not trigger immediate taxation. The
Ninth Circuit decision in Minor v. United States196 might also
support this view, though it has not previously been mentioned
by commentators. Both cases are discussed below.
a. Childs v. Commissioner
In Childs, the Tax Court concluded that a promise to pay
from a party other than the service recipient did not constitute
property for § 83 purposes. 197 However, due to the extremely
complicated facts in the case, the Tax Court in Childs did not
appear to recognize that the promise in question was from a
third party.
"the transferor is not the person for whom such services are performed," sug-
gests that the term "transferor" as used in the § 83 regulations refers to only
the formal transferor (i.e., the person who actually transfers the property in
question). This is an improper inference because Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) deals
only with the general application of § 83 and is not, unlike Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
3(e), concerned with the definition of property for § 83 purposes. In addition,
the last sentence in Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) was simply intended to reinforce
the clear principle that § 83 applies to all transfers of property made in con-
nection with the provision of services, regardless of whether the service recipi-
ent or another party is the technical transferor of the property.
194. Brodie v. Comm'r, 1 T.C. 275, 281 (1942) (describing the annuity con-
tract as having been "issued in the name of the annuitant and... delivered to
him").
195. 103 T.C. 634 (1994).
196. 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
197. 103 T.C. at 653.
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The taxpayers in Childs were members of a law firm that
had executed a contingent fee agreement with a client pursuant
to which the law firm would provide legal services in connection
with various tort claims. 198 The fee agreement provided that,
upon settlement of the claims, the law firm would be entitled to
a specified percentage of the recovery. 199 The client who re-
tained the firm was a widow whose husband had been killed by
an explosion caused by the accumulation of gas in their home,
which also seriously injured the client's minor child. The client
hired the law firm to prosecute her husband's wrongful death
claim as well as her child's personal injury claim.200
The child's claim was settled first. Both the client, on be-
half of the child, and the attorneys accepted a structured set-
tlement providing that the child would receive his damage
award, and the attorneys their fees, over time.201 In implement-
ing this settlement, the defendant's casualty insurance carrier
(Insurance Company) promised to make specified periodic
payments to the attorneys. 202 In exchange for a lump sum fee
paid by the Insurance Company, another company, First Ex-
ecutive Corporation (First Executive), agreed to assume the li-
ability for making these periodic payments; however the Insur-
ance Company remained secondarily liable for the payments.20 3
First Executive then purchased an annuity from a life insur-
ance company, Executive Life Insurance Company (Executive
Life), naming the attorneys as beneficiaries. 204 Nonetheless,
First Executive remained the owner of the annuities and had
the unrestricted power to change the beneficiaries. 205
The wrongful death claim was settled shortly thereafter in
a similar manner.20 6 The attorneys again received a promise by
Insurance Company to make specified periodic payments.20 7 In-
surance Company then purchased an annuity from Manufac-
turers Life Insurance Company (Manufacturers Life), naming
the attorneys as beneficiaries, though Insurance Company re-
198. Id. at 637-38.
199. Id. at 637.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 640-42.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 640-41.
204. Id. at 643.
205. Id. at 643-44.
206. Id. at 645.
207. Id. at 645-46.
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mained the owner of the annuity with unrestricted power to
change the beneficiaries. 208
The main issue in Childs was whether the attorneys real-
ized income immediately to the extent of the fair market value
of the Insurance Company's promises that they received or, al-
ternatively, whether the attorneys realized income only as they
received actual cash payments. 20 9 Resolution of this issue, of
course, turned on the question of whether these promises con-
stituted property for purposes of § 83.210
Despite the complicated facts in Childs, the answer to this
question should have been obvious. The attorneys performed
services for their client, not for the Insurance Company or any
of the other obligors to which they could look for payment. As a
result, the attorneys received a third-party promise, which is
always immediately taxable. 211
Indeed, the facts of the Childs case are strikingly similar to
those of Brodie and Drescher where the taxpayers therein, in
exchange for services provided to their employers, received
promises to pay from unrelated insurance companies. 212 Yet
neither of these cases was mentioned by the Tax Court in
Childs, and the importance of the identity of the party issuing
the promise was completely missed. Instead, the Tax Court fo-
cused entirely, and erroneously, on whether the third-party
promises themselves were funded or secured, concluding ulti-
mately that they were neither.213 As a result, the Tax Court
208. Id.
209. Id. at 636.
210. See id. at 648-49.
211. See Butler, supra note 124, at 116-20 (explaining why this should
have been the result in Childs).
212. See id. The identity of a third-party obligor is not relevant to the ques-
tion of whether the promise is immediately taxable. While this would impact
the valuation of the promise, it should not have any impact on the issue of
whether the third-party promise is property in the first place. We mention the
similarity of obligors only to make clear how preposterous it was for the Childs
court to ignore completely these opinions.
213. Childs, 103 T.C. at 649-53. Even the Tax Court's "secured or funded"
analysis was flawed. In each of the structured settlements, there was more
than one obligor to whom the taxpayers could look for payment. In other
words, even pretending that the Insurance Company was a party to the ser-
vice transaction, the taxpayers still had the benefit of third-party promises.
With regard to the structured settlement entered into on behalf of the child,
the taxpayers could look to First Executive for payment in addition to Insur-
ance Company. Id. at 640-41. Likewise, in the client's settlement, the taxpay-
ers could look to Manufacturer's Life for payment in addition to Insurance
Company. Id. at 646. As a result, Insurance Company's contractual obligations
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held that the attorneys realized income only as cash payments
were made.
The Tax Court's fundamental error was caused in part by
the IRS, which failed to argue the third-party promise issue at
all. Ironically, while the taxpayers in their initial brief actually
raised the issue, arguing that the identity of the obligor was ir-
relevant, 214 the IRS in its response brief inexplicably ignored
the issue.215 This enabled the taxpayers to assert in their reply
brief that the IRS apparently conceded that the identity of the
obligor of a promise to pay is irrelevant for purposes of § 83.216
This failure by the IRS is particularly perplexing because,
shortly before the Childs case was heard, the IRS issued two
private letter rulings on almost identical facts that concluded
to pay, analyzed in their own right, should have been considered secured and
therefore immediately taxable.
The Tax Court, however, was unmoved by the number of potential obli-
gors. The court found the existence of the guarantee to be irrelevant, stating
that "[I]t is well settled that a simple guarantee does not make a promise se-
cured, because by definition a guarantee is itself a promise to pay." Id. at 652.
This analysis may be appropriate where the guarantor is related to and pos-
sesses a unified economic interest with the promisor, and thus the identity of
the true promisor is difficult to ascertain. See Berry v. United States, 593 F.
Supp. 80 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (holding that a sole shareholder guaranty of corpo-
rate employer's promise to pay did not render such promise "secured" for pur-
poses of § 83). However, the blanket conclusion that any guaranty of a promise
to pay is irrelevant for purposes of § 83 is wholly inconsistent with the eco-
nomic benefit doctrine, which is premised on the notion that the service pro-
vider must remain a general unsecured creditor of the service recipient for a
service provider to defer income on a contractual right to payment.
214. Brief for Petitioners Richard A. Childs and Mimi P. Childs at 11-12,
Childs (No. 15639-92); Brief for Petitioners Swearingen and Phillips at 37,
Childs (No. 15639-92). The taxpayers' arguments here were based entirely on
a literal interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e). To support their view, they
noted that § 83 applies to tax the receipt of property by a service provider re-
gardless of the identify of the transferor and that, accordingly, "[i]t is nonsen-
sical to assert that anyone can transfer Section 83 property, but the definition
of property in that Section only applies if the service recipient is the trans-
feror." Brief for Petitioners Richard A. Childs and Mimi P. Childs, supra, at
12. There are two responses to this argument. First, while it is certainly true
that § 83 would apply regardless of the identity of the transferor (for example,
if X transfers Microsoft stock to its employee as a bonus, § 83 clearly applies),
that does not mean that, with respect to all issues that arise under § 83, the
identity of the transferor is unimportant. Second, the transferor In the third-
party promise cases is always, in substance while perhaps not in form, the
service recipient. In Childs, the client is the one who transferred her rights to
future payment to the attorneys.
215. Brief for Respondent, Childs (No. 15639-92).
216. Reply Brief for Petitioners Richard A. Childs and Mimi P. Childs at 6
n.1, Childs (No. 15639-92).
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that the deferred payment obligations received by the attorneys
were immediately taxable because they involved third-party
promises. 217
In summary, the decision in Childs does not provide com-
pelling support for the proposition that a naked promise to pay
issued by a party other than the service recipient is excluded
from the definition of property for § 83 purposes. The third-
party issue was not litigated by the parties-in part as a result
of the IRS's error 2 1 8 -nor was it analyzed or even considered by
the Tax Court.21 9
217. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-36-001 (May 12, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-34-004
(May 7, 1991). Furthermore, in its brief to the Eleventh Circuit in the appeal
of Childs, the government finally argued that because the obligors were dis-
tinct from the recipient of the taxpayer's services, the obligations to pay were
immediately taxable. Brief for the Appellant, 1995 WL 17110345, at 24-29,
Childs v. Comm'r, 89 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court in a decision without reported opinion. Id. Thus, the appellate
court did not address this argument.
218. Given the almost contemporaneous private letter rulings on the same
facts, it is clear that Childs should not be viewed as a deliberate concession on
the issue either. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
219. McGowan and Brisendine point to another Tax Court case, Mitchell v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1099 (1976), as support for the view that a compensa-
tory third-party promise is not immediately taxable. See Selling Stock Options,
supra note 9, at 98-99. In that case, which McGowan and Brisendine note
predates § 83 and its regulations governing the treatment of nonstatutory
stock options, the taxpayer sold nonstatutory stock options to a third party in
exchange for that party's promise to make annual payments of $55,100 in each
of the three years following the year of the sale. Id. at 98. The issue addressed
by the Tax Court was whether the option sold by the taxpayer was properly
taxable when the option was granted under old Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6. Mitchell,
65 T.C. at 1106. The court concluded that the option was not taxable upon
grant. Id. at 1113. As a result, the court determined that the taxpayer realized
ordinary income from the sale of the options. Id. at 1113-14. In addition, in
the last sentence of the opinion, the court noted that "since no payments were
received in [the year of the sale of the option], and [taxpayer] reported his in-
come on the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, [the IRS]
has conceded that [taxpayer] realized ordinary income only as payments were
received, beginning in [the year following the sale]." Id. at 1114. Of course,
this is wrong because the purchaser's promise was a third-party promise,
which should have been taxable immediately, but the Tax Court never ad-
dressed the issue because of the IRS's mistaken concession. Furthermore, the
IRS's concession should not be considered as evidence of the government's
view that the identity of the obligor is irrelevant, given that the IRS ruled in
two contemporaneous Revenue Rulings that third-party promises were imme-
diately taxable. See Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1
C.B. 140.
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b. Minor v. Commissioner
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Minor v. United States220 is
another flawed case that could be cited in support of the notion
that unfunded and unsecured third-party promises to pay are
not property for purposes of § 83. Minor involved a physician
who had entered into an agreement with Snohomish County
Physicians Corporation (Snohomish). Pursuant to this agree-
ment, the physician agreed to provide medical services to mem-
bers of Snohomish's prepaid medical plan in exchange for speci-
fied fees to be paid by Snohomish.221
The physician and Snohomish later amended this agree-
ment to provide for the possibility that some of the fees earned
by the physician might be deferred. 222 Specifically, the amend-
ment allowed the physician to decide whether to defer between
10% and 90% of the fees before they were earned. 223 If a defer-
ral election were made, Snohomish promised to pay to the phy-
sician the deferred amounts, plus an investment return, upon
specified future events.224 In the years at issue, the physician
elected to defer 90% of his fees.225
To implement this deferred compensation plan, Snohomish
set up a trust, with the physician and two other doctors as trus-
tees and with Snohomish as the beneficiary.226 The fees that
the physician elected to defer were deposited into the trust,
where they were invested. 227
The issue in Minor was whether, with respect to the de-
ferred amounts, the physician was taxed immediately on the
value of Snohomish's promise to pay or whether, instead, the
physician would report income only as cash payments were
made. 228 In concluding that the physician would report income
only as cash payments were made by Snohomish, the Ninth
Circuit focused on the fact that Snohomish was the beneficiary
of the trust and, as a result, "the assets of the trust remain
solely those of Snohomish ... and subject to the claims of its
220. 772 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985).
221. Id. at 1473.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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general creditors."229 Consequently, the court concluded that
Snohomish's promise to pay the physician was unfunded and
therefore not property for purposes of § 83.230
As in Childs, this conclusion was wrong. The court failed to
appreciate that Snohomish's promise was a third-party prom-
ise, given that the physician received the promise in connection
with the medical services provided to the physician's patient.
231
Once again, the analogy to Brodie and Drescher is particularly
apt-in those cases, as in Minor, the defendants performed ser-
vices for one party and received a promise to pay from an-
other.232 Yet, like the Tax Court in Childs, the Ninth Circuit
never mentioned these cases.
Even more astounding than the court's failure to apply the
third-party promise rule is its treatment of a series of Revenue
Rulings that are directly on point and that should have led the
court to the proper conclusion. Recall that in Revenue Rulings
69-50 and 77-420, the IRS considered facts entirely identical to
those in Minor.233 In the rulings, the IRS ruled that the in-
surer's promise was immediately taxable "based on the fact
that the physician's income arises out of the physician's acqui-
sition from the patient of a right to payment from the [medical
plan]." 234 The IRS pointed to these rulings in support of its po-
sition that Snohomish's promises were immediately taxable,
but the Ninth Circuit rejected the relevance of the rulings:
Those rulings did involve fact patterns very similar to the instant
case. However, those rulings concluded that the physician had effec-
tively obtained the income because his right to immediate compensa-
tion emanated from the medical services rendered to patients, inde-
pendent of his voluntary agreement with the [medical plan] to defer a
percentage of payments otherwise due for those services. The essence
of those rulings was that the physician had constructively received the
income before assigning it to the deferred compensation program. As
the government has conceded the issue of constructive receipt of in-
come, those rulings are not on point.235
229. Id. at 1475.
230. Id. at 1475-76.
231. Id. at 1473.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 126-47 (analyzing Brodie and Dre-
scher).
233. 1969-1 C.B. 140; 1977-2 C.B. 172.
234. Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172,
173.
235. Minor, 772 F.2d at 1475 n.1 (emphasis added) (citing Rev. Rul. 69-50,
1969-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172, 173).
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The court thus interpreted the rulings to be based on notions of
constructive receipt and not economic benefit.
This interpretation of the rulings is patently wrong. These
rulings focused exclusively on the third-party promise issue,
and were based on the fact that the promisors were distinct
from the service recipients.236 The rulings cite Brodie and Dre-
scher, among other economic benefit cases, but do not cite any
constructive receipt cases. 237 Furthermore, both rulings ex-
plained that the election to defer a fee was made before the ser-
vices that gave rise to the fee were performed, a structure that
was explicitly exempted from constructive receipt attack in
Revenue Ruling 60-31.238
If this is not enough, the last paragraph of Revenue Ruling
77-420 proves irrefutably that the third-party issue and not
constructive receipt served as the foundation for its conclusion:
This conclusion [that the physicians are immediately taxed upon re-
ceipt of the insurer's promise] is not inconsistent with that of Rev.
Rul. 69-474, 1969-2 C.B. 105, which holds that a partnership com-
posed of physicians that, pursuant to an agreement, furnishes medi-
cal services to a nonprofit medical and hospital service corporation
does not derive any gross income by reason of any interest in or right
under the corporation's retirement plan provided for the physicians.
In Rev. Rul. 69-474, the corporation was contractually obligated to
furnish medical services to its members, the partnership entered into
an employment relationship directly with the corporation to provide
the services, and the compensation received by the partnership from
the corporation was not related to any particular services provided to
any specific patients or based on any particular type of service or con-
tractual relationship existing between the patients and the partner-
ship.239
This excerpt demonstrates that the basis for Revenue Ruling
77-420's conclusion was that the promise to pay in question was
made by someone other than the recipient of the physician's
236. Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172,
173.
237. In fact, the common tax term of art "constructive receipt" was not
mentioned in either ruling. Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B. 140; Rev. Rul. 77-420,
1977-2 C.B. 172.
238. 1960-1 C.B. 174, 179 (example 3). The IRS will issue advance rulings
concerning the application of the constructive receipt doctrine to deferred
compensation arrangements only if the service provider elected to defer com-
pensation before the taxable year in which the services were rendered. See
Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698; Rev. Proc. 92-65, 1992-2 C.B. 428. However,
case law suggests that the doctrine of constructive receipt may apply even
where the decision to defer is made later. See Comm'r v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711,
713 (7th Cir. 1953); Veit v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 919, 922 (1949).
239. 1977-2 C.B. 172, 173 (emphasis added).
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services. In contrast, Revenue Ruling 69-474 allowed deferral
because, under its facts, the promisor was the physician's em-
ployer. 240
It is thus abundantly clear that the Ninth Circuit's attempt
to distinguish the case from Revenue Rulings 69-50 and 77-420
was misguided. In fact, the rulings are indistinguishable. As a
result of this mistake, the Minor court never realized the im-
portance of the critical fact that a third-party promise was in-
volved. Because, like the Tax Court in Childs, the Ninth Circuit
in Minor never considered the third-party promise issue, the
decision does not support the view that naked third-party
promises are not property for § 83 purposes.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ECS TRANSACTION
The conclusion that a third-party promise to pay consti-
tutes property for purposes of § 83 is by itself sufficient to ne-
gate the intended tax benefits of the ECS shelter. Recall that
Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7(a) provides that § 83(a) applies to
the money or property received by the taxpayer in an arm's-
length sale of the stock options in the same manner as § 83(a)
would apply to the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise
of the option. In other words, the executive is taxed as if the
employer had transferred to him the family partnership note in
consideration for his services. 241 Accordingly, upon implemen-
tation of the ECS shelter, the executive is taxed immediately
upon the fair market value of the promissory note which, as
previously discussed,242 the executive must concede equals the
240. 1969-2 C.B. 105. Put differently, in Revenue Ruling 77-420, the obli-
gor of the promise to pay received by the physician merely indemnified the pa-
tients for certain medical expenses that they incurred. 1977-2 C.B. 172. In
Revenue Ruling 69-474, the obligor agreed to provide the medical services to
the patient and employed the physicians to perform these services. 1969-2
C.B. 105.
241. One commentator has argued that the partnership's promise is a sec-
ond-party promise received in a sale of the options, not a compensatory third-
party promise. See John F. Prusiecki, Equity Compensation Strategy FLP
Note: The Debate Continues, 98 TAX NOTES 1455 (2003). However, Treasury
Regulation § 1.83-7(a) (last sentence) provides that, when the option is sold,
§ 83 applies to the consideration received in the sale. In other words, consis-
tent with the idea that a nonqualified option constitutes a "tax nothing," the
regulation treats the consideration received in a sale of such an option as com-
pensation, not as the proceeds from a sale of property. See Gregg D. Polsky,
How Should an FLP's Note Be Treated? The Debate Continues, 98 TAX NOTES
1771 (2003).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82.
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fair market value of the transferred options. Thus, rather than
deferring the realization of income as intended, the shelter ac-
tually accelerates the realization event. 243
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS-THE ECONOMICS OF
DEFERRAL
Thus far we have explained that, as a purely doctrinal
matter, third-party promises to pay are immediately taxable to
service providers upon their receipt. This Part IV explains why
the issue is important as a policy matter and why this doctrinal
conclusion is supported by policy considerations.
A. TREATMENT OF SERVICE PROVIDER
For tax reasons, a service provider would generally prefer
to defer tax on compensation income-with interest accruing on
the compensation and with the tax on the interest income like-
wise deferred-rather than realizing the compensation income
and interest income as they economically accrue. 244 To illus-
trate, assume that, in consideration for services performed on
Day 1 of Year 1, an employee has the option of receiving
$10,000 immediately or $11,000 at the beginning of Year 2. As-
sume further that the prevailing interest rate is 10%.
It should first be recognized that the deferred payment op-
tion constitutes the economic equivalent of (1) an immediate
payment of the $10,000 by the employer to the employee, fol-
lowed by (2) a lending of the money back to the employer at the
prevailing 10% interest rate. 245 Therefore, in a world without
taxes, the employee's choice would depend entirely on whether
to invest his compensation in his employer's debt instrument
(by choosing the deferred payment) or in some other invest-
ment (by choosing the immediate payment).
In such a world without taxes, if the employee were indif-
ferent about this investment choice, the employee would be
equally indifferent about this deferral decision. 246 If the em-
243. If the executive had maintained ownership of the stock options, he
would not have been taxed until the options were exercised.
244. This assumes, of course, that the service provider does not wish to
consume the compensation currently but rather wants to save the compensa-
tion and consume it later. We make this assumption throughout the ensuing
discussion.
245. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the '"ime Value of
Money,"95 YALE L.J. 506, 519 (1986).
246. The employee presumably would be indifferent if the risk of default by
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ployee chooses to receive the $10,000 today, he could invest the
$10,000, earning 10%, and would ultimately be left with
$11,000 at the beginning of Year 2, resulting in the same out-
come as under the deferred payment option.247
If, however, the employee were subject to a 40% income tax
and if that tax were imposed using a pure cash method (i.e., by
taxing income only upon actual cash receipt),248 the employee
would prefer the deferred payment. If he elects the immediate
payment, the employee will have only $6,000 available after tax
to invest and will be able to earn an after-tax interest rate of
only 6%. As a result, the employee ends up with $6,360 at the
beginning of Year 2.249
Alternatively, if the employee chooses the deferred pay-
ment option, the employee would pay tax only when he receives
the $11,000 payment at the beginning of Year 2. As a result, at
that time, the employee will have $6,600 after tax (i.e., $11,000
less $4,400), or $240 more than under the immediate payment
scenario.
This disparity may seem strange at first glance because
the employee in both scenarios is ultimately paying tax on all of
the dollars that he receives. Importantly, however, the timing
of tax is very different. In the immediate payment context, the
employee is paying an immediate tax as his right to income
economically accrues. As a result, the employee is able to invest
only an after-tax amount of his compensation (i.e., $6,000 in-
stead of $10,000). By contrast, under the deferred payment
scenario, the employee effectively invests (by lending the
$10,000 to which he is entitled by virtue of his performance of
services) the entire $10,000. In essence, the deferral allows the
the employer equals the risk of default on the alternative investment yielding
10%. However, given that insolvency by the employer would likely cost the
employee his job, in the interest of diversification of risk, perhaps the em-
ployee would choose the alternative investment with all else being equal.
247. The taxpayer would be equally indifferent if he was subject to a con-
sumption tax rather than an income tax. If he was subject to a consumption
tax, an amount of income would be taxed only when he used it to purchase
personal consumption. Thus, there would be no tax consequences under a con-
sumption tax under either option until the taxpayer consumes.
248. By "pure cash method," we mean that the deferral option will not trig-
ger constructive receipt. Cf. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 178-79 (discuss-
ing the doctrine of constructive receipt and ruling that it generally will not be
implicated if the choice to defer is made in the taxable year preceding the year
in which the services will be performed).
249. The $6,000 investment would earn $600 of interest, however, the tax-
payer would have to remit $240 of the interest in taxes.
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employee to have the benefit of investing for his own account
what would otherwise be the government's money.
What if in the above example, instead of taxing the em-
ployee when he actually receives cash, he were taxed on a pure
accrual method, so that he realized income when he becomes
entitled to it (i.e., when he performs his services)? Under the
immediate payment scenario, the conclusion is the same as
above, because in that situation payment is made simultane-
ously with performance.
Under the deferred payment scenario, however, the right
to receive $11,000 in a year would trigger realization of the
present value of that amount of $10,000, requiring the em-
ployee to use $4,000 of his own funds (that he otherwise could
have invested in an instrument yielding the prevailing interest
rate of 10%) to pay the immediate tax. Therefore, the effect of
accrual taxation would be the same as under the immediate
payment scenario, because the employee is unable to invest the
government's money for his own account.
It is clear that the accrual method is the economically ac-
curate method to tax the employee. 250 Therefore, the conceptu-
ally proper tax treatment of the two payment scenarios-which
differ only in form and not in economic substance-would result
in the employee ending up with $6,360 at the beginning of Year
2. However, by allowing individuals to report their income on
the cash receipts and disbursements method, Congress permits
deferral and its concomitant tax benefits with very few limita-
tions or restrictions. Moreover, individuals generally can very
easily comply with the restrictions and limitations that do ex-
ist.251 Why is it so easy for employees to obtain the much-
desired deferral? One explanation, concerning the tax treat-
ment of payors of deferred compensation, is discussed below.
B. TREATMENT OF SERVICE RECIPIENTS
Using the same example but viewed this time from the
employer's perspective, the employer (just like the employee)
would be indifferent regarding the two payment scenarios in a
no-tax world. If the employee chooses the immediate payment
option, the employer's cost is $10,000 on Day 1 of Year 1. If the
250. Halperin, supra note 245, at 541-42.
251. To achieve deferral, the only obstacles to avoid are the doctrines of
constructive receipt, cash equivalency, and economic benefit, all of which are
relatively easy for taxpayers to navigate.
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employee chooses the deferred payment option, the employer
could take this $10,000 that he would have otherwise paid, in-
vest it at 10%, and then use the aggregate $11,000 amount to
pay the employee on Day I of Year 2. Thus, under either option,
the employer's cost would be the same.
By contrast, if the employer were subject to a 40% income
tax, and if the employer's realization of the compensation de-
duction were tied to the time of the cash-method employee's in-
come realization as it is under current law,2 52 the employer
would prefer the immediate payment scenario. In that situa-
tion, the employer's after-tax cost on Day 1 of Year 1 would be
$6,000 (the $10,000 payment less the $4,000 value of the
$10,000 deduction). If, however, the employee chooses the de-
ferred payment option, the employer would have to set aside
more than this $6,000 on Day 1 of Year 1 to satisfy the obliga-
tion to pay $11,000 on Day 1 of Year 2. If the employer sets
aside only $6,000,253 the employer would earn interest at the
after-tax rate of 6%. Therefore, on Day 1 of Year 2, the em-
ployer would be left with $6,360 in this fund. Grossing this
amount up to compute a pre-tax payment that would leave the
employer out-of-pocket by this $6,360 amount yields a payment
of only $10,600, or $400 less than what is required. To fund the
entire $11,000 payment on Day 1 of Year 2, the employer would
have to set aside $6,226.42, which by Day 1 of Year 2 would
grow to $6,600, which when grossed up would equal the
$11,000 payment.
In other words, in this 40%-tax world, the employer would
be indifferent regarding the choice between an immediate pay-
ment of $10,000 or a deferred payment of $10,600. However, as
between an immediate payment of $10,000 or a deferred pay-
ment of $11,000, the choice for the employer is abundantly
clear-the $10,000 immediate payment-because the $11,000
252. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (as amended in 2004) (deferring the employer's
deduction for nonqualified deferred compensation until the amount is includ-
ible in the employee's gross income); I.R.C. § 404(a)(11) (as amended in 2004)
(providing that no amount shall be treated as paid to the employee until it is
actually received by the employee); see also I.R.C. § 404(d) (as amended in
2004) (providing the same rule in the context of independent contractor rela-
tionships).
253. This amount is not grossed up to reflect any tax benefit to the em-
ployer from setting the amount aside because under the assumed tax system,
the employer's deduction is timed to coordinate with the cash-method em-
ployee's income realization, which would not occur until the employee actually
receives cash on Day 1 of Year 2.
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deferred payment would cost the employer $226.42 more in af-
ter-tax dollars on Day 1 of Year 1. This $226.42, if invested at
the after-tax rate of 6%, would grow to $240 by Day 1 of Year 2,
the precise amount of the after-tax benefit to the employee on
that day resulting from the deferred payment scenario.
This example shows that, where the employer and em-
ployee are subject to the same tax rates, the Code's tying of
timing of the employer's deduction to the time of the employee's
income realization results in a zero-sum game for both (i) the
government, and (ii) the employer and the employee when they
are considered in the aggregate. Whatever the employee gains
from the deferral of income, the employer loses from deferral of
the deduction. As a result, the government is indifferent, as-
suming tax rate equivalence, and its task could properly be lim-
ited to ensuring consistent reporting between the parties as to
the timing of the employee's income and the employer's deduc-
tion realization.
In other words, with tax rate equivalence, the employee
and employer's decision to use a deferred compensation plan
would necessarily depend entirely on nontax factors. 25 4 Because
any tax benefit received by the employee would be offset per-
fectly by a tax burden to the employer, with arm's-length bar-
gaining such a tax benefit should reduce dollar-for-dollar (de-
termined on an after-tax basis) some other form of
compensation, such as cash.
In his classic article on the time value of money, Professor
Daniel Halperin explains that the zero-sum game phenomenon
is driven entirely by the taxation of the investment income on
the employee's compensation. 255 In the case of immediate pay-
ment, the employee is directly (and appropriately) taxed on the
investment income. 256 In the case of the deferred payment, in-
stead of taxing the employee on the investment income (which
would be theoretically appropriate because he has economically
earned the principal), the employer is taxed on this income. 257
Thus, in the deferred payment scenario, the employee is
undertaxed while the employer is overtaxed. 258 Because the
amount of undertaxation and overtaxation offset each other,
254. See Halperin, supra note 245, at 543.
255. See id. at 508.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 523.
258. See id.
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assuming tax rate equivalence, the taxation of the employer on
the investment income is a perfect substitute for the taxation of
the proper party, the employee. 259 As a result, as a tax policy
matter, if both employer and employee are taxed similarly on
their investment income, the tax law could allow the parties
simply to elect to defer or not to defer, so long as they report
the transactions consistently.2
60
In the real world, however, employers and employees often
do not face the same rate of taxation on their investment in-
come. 261 Indeed, the lack of tax rate equivalence and its result-
ing significant arbitrage opportunities actually drive the devel-
opment of deferred compensation arrangements.
262
C. ARBITRAGE
For various reasons, corporate employers are often able to
achieve lower rates of tax on investment income than their em-
ployees. As Professor Halperin explains:
Taxable employers may effectively exempt investment income from
tax to the extent that they have excess loss carryovers. Alternatively,
these employers can invest deferred compensation in securities that
pay dividends, which are [generally 70%] exempt from tax. In addi-
tion, if the employer invests in its own securities, appreciation in the
value of those securities will not be subject to tax if, instead of issuing
stock directly to the employee, the employer holds the stock itself for
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 540.
262. See id. at 511 (noting that "these transactions are often designed to
exploit differences in tax rates"). In addition, the potential for changing tax
rates over time may also serve as an impetus for these arrangements. Even if
investment income is taxed similarly whether earned by the employee or the
employer, the parties would be better off (when considered in the aggregate)
under either of the following conditions: (i) the employee's tax rates are ex-
pected to decline between economic performance and actual payment, or (ii)
the employer's tax rates are expected to rise between economic performance
and actual payment. For the typical deferred compensation participants, the
first condition (declining tax rates at the employee level) is not likely. Rather,
these individuals are, and most likely will be, taxed at the highest marginal
rate on their investment income. See BRISENDINE ET AL., supra note 168, at A-
2 (stating that rate smoothing at the employee level is likely more perceived
than real). The potential for increasing rates at the employer level, however,
may be more realistic. Given the corporate tax sheltering currently available,
a corporate employer may reasonably estimate that its marginal tax rates will
be higher in the future, believing that the tax shelter opportunities will even-
tually be foreclosed or at least hindered by legislative, administrative, or judi-
cial action.
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the benefit of the employee or provides for a deferred compensation
arrangement tied to the value of the stock.263
Furthermore, the recent massive proliferation of corporate tax
shelters has driven down effective corporate tax rates signifi-
cantly.264 As a result, the assumed tax equivalence is an en-
tirely false assumption in many cases in which deferred com-
pensation plans have been developed by corporations.
If a corporation's tax rate on investment income is lower
than its employees' individual tax rates on investment income,
the opportunity for arbitrage exists. In such a case, a deferred
compensation arrangement would allow the employee effec-
tively to invest his compensation through the corporation,
thereby obtaining the benefit of these lower tax rates.265 To
show the effects of tax arbitrage, assume in the $10,000/
$11,000 example above that the employer's investment income
was subject to a tax rate of 5%, while all other income (i.e., all
of the employee's income and all of the employer's non-
investment income) was subject to a tax rate of 40%.
In the immediate payment scenario, the employer's after-
tax cost on Day 1 of Year 1 would equal $6,000, the $10,000
payment less the 40% tax benefit of the deduction. 266 Keeping
that $6,000 after-tax Year 1 cost constant, the employer could
set aside the $6,000 and earn an after-tax rate of interest of
9.5%. At the beginning of Year 2, the fund will have grown to
$6,570. Grossing this amount up so that the employer's after-
tax cost equals this amount yields a $10,950 payment. There-
fore, from the employer's perspective, a payment of $10,000 on
Day 1 of Year 1 has the same cost as a payment of $10,950 on
Day 1 of Year 2.
When the employee receives the $10,950 at that time, he
will owe tax in the amount of $4,380, leaving him with $6,570.
By comparison, had the employee chosen the immediate
$10,000 payment, he would be left with only $6,360 after tax on
Day 1 of Year 2. Ultimately, as a result of the deferred pay-
ment, the employee is better off by $210 after tax, while the
263. Halperin, supra note 245, at 540 (footnotes omitted).
264. See George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?:
Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REV. 1793, 1793-
95 (2003).
265. See Halperin, supra note 245, at 523, 540.
266. The employer gets a 40% tax benefit because the compensation deduc-
tion would be allowed to offset business income, which is assumed to be sub-
ject to a 40% tax rate.
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employer is no worse off. As Professor Halperin explained, this
benefit results from the fact that, in the deferred payment sce-
nario, the 10% interest on the employee's $6,000 of compensa-
tion (after payment of the tax on the compensation) was effec-
tively taxed at the employer's low 5% rate, yielding a tax of
only $30 on the $600 interest income, instead of the employee's
high 40% rate, which would have yielded a tax of $240 on the
interest income.267
In this case, the tax arbitrage benefit was captured entirely
by the employee because the employer, though not worse off as
a result of the deferral, did not improve its economic position
through the deferral arrangement. However, it is easy to design
a payment structure that would leave the employee in the same
position as if he received immediate payment, thereby allowing
the employer to capture the entire arbitrage benefit. To leave
the employee in the same position, the employee must have
$6,360 after tax on Day 1 of Year 2. Because the employee is
subject to a 40% tax rate, the Year 2 payment must equal
$10,600. In such a case, the employee is left in the same posi-
tion as if an immediate payment of $10,000 were made, while
the employer has $210 more after tax on Day 1 of Year 2.268
These two examples show the extreme cases, where the tax
arbitrage benefit goes entirely to one or the other party. How-
ever, because cooperation is required between the parties-the
employee must be willing to delay receipt of cash and the em-
ployer must be willing to delay payment-to achieve the tax
arbitrage benefit, it may be reasonable to assume that the arbi-
trage benefit would ordinarily be split in some manner between
the employer and the employee. Thus, instead of a deferred
payment of $10,950 (where all of the benefit goes to the em-
ployee) or a deferred payment of $10,600 (where all of the bene-
fit goes to the employer), the parties could arrange for a de-
ferred payment of $10,775. This would allow the employee and
the employer to capture a $175 pre-tax (and $105 after-tax)
benefit.
To recapitulate, assuming equivalent tax rates on invest-
ment income, a purely elective deferral system, one where the
employer and the employee would elect collectively whether to
267. See Halperin, supra note 245, at 509-11.
268. The employer pays only $10,600, instead of $10,950, so the employer
saves $350 before taxes. Because this $350, if paid, would give rise to a deduc-
tion worth 40%, the after-tax benefit to the employer in this case is $350 less
(0.4 x $350), or $210.
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defer income and deduction realization, would work perfectly
well as long as the parties maintained consistent reporting.
This notion perhaps explains the extremely lax rules regarding
deferral and why it is so easy to obtain deferral.269 However, it
is precisely the lack of rate equivalency and the resulting arbi-
trage that drives the development of nonqualified deferred
compensation arrangements.
D. THE PROBLEMS WITH ARBITRAGE
The arbitrage possibilities described above are troublesome
for a variety of reasons. As previously noted, a pure accrual
system--or a regime which has effects consistent with such a
system-is the theoretically appropriate and economically ac-
curate one.2 70 Regardless of whether the employee invests his
earned compensation himself or whether the employer invests
this compensation on the employee's account, the investment
income that flows from this compensation should be taxed the
same. 271 The current tax regime strays from this ideal (to the
employer's and/or employee's benefit) in cases where the em-
ployer's tax rate on investment income is lower than the em-
ployee's rate on such income.272 Because of this departure from
the ideal, three adverse consequences result.
First, the employer and the employee, viewed in the aggre-
gate, receive "an unwarranted and unintended subsidy,"273
which they can divvy up as they see fit. To the extent that the
employee captures the benefit, there exists a nontransparent
subsidy to a high-income individual. To the extent that the em-
ployer captures the benefit, this nontransparent subsidy runs
to the corporation.
Second, the arbitrage possibilities substantially reduce the
incentive for corporations to set up and fund so-called "quali-
fied" plans. 274 These qualified plans effectively allow invest-
ment income to go untaxed. 275 In exchange for this subsidy, the
Code requires that these qualified plans provide benefits for
low- and mid-level workers; in other words, these plans cannot
269. See supra note 251 (describing lax requirements for obtaining defer-
ral).
270. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
271. See Halperin, supra note 245, at 539.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 541.
274. See id. at 539-40.
275. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000) (exempting qualified plans from taxation).
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discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. 276
However, as explained above, 277 under the right circumstances,
even nonqualified arrangements, which do not have the nondis-
crimination requirements of qualified plans, can result in the
nontaxation (or extremely light taxation) of investment in-
come. 278 In such circumstances, "employers may choose to pro-
vide benefits only for their highly paid employees, thus circum-
venting the congressional mandate to protect low and moderate
wage earners."279
Third, the existence of arbitrage benefits creates signifi-
cant distortions with respect to the joint decision made by em-
ployers and employees whether to pay compensation immedi-
ately or in the future. In a no-tax world, the decision would
appear to depend mostly on whether employees wish to lend to
employers, as opposed to other borrowers, and, vice versa,
whether employers wish to borrow from the employees, as op-
posed to other lenders. It would seem that, in the absence of tax
ramifications, employees would ordinarily choose not to overin-
vest in their employers, and employers would prefer to use tra-
ditional lenders.28 0 Because of the considerable arbitrage oppor-
tunities, however, these nontax factors are entirely swamped in
significance. The tax law thus creates overwhelming incentives
for the parties to defer payment to high-tax employees, violat-
ing the tax policy goal of neutrality.
276. See id. § 401(a)(4) (directing that qualified plans may not "discrimi-
nate in favor of highly compensated employees"); see also STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION., 108TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND
RELATING TO THE FUNDING RULES FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED
BENEFIT PLANS AND THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF THE PENSION BENEFIT
GUARANTY CORPORATION ("PBGC") 2-3 (Comm. Print 2003) (describing the
nondiscrimination rules). For a critique of the nondiscrimination rules, see Jo-
seph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790 (1988).
277. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the arbitrage that is possible when
the employer's tax rate on investment income is low).
278. See Halperin, supra note 245, at 540-41.
279. Id.
280. In addition to these basic financial issues, an employer might prefer to
pay some deferred compensation to "promote an employer's image as socially
responsible, or to encourage retirement while making room for younger em-
ployees." Id. at 543. However, these concerns would seem to be insignificant in
the typical case where the employee receiving nonqualified deferred compen-
sation is a highly compensated executive.
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E. MAINTAINING A FRICTION ON DEFERRAL
Because of the significant tax arbitrage benefits available
with respect to nonqualified deferred compensation and the re-
sulting unfortunate policy implications, the economic benefit
doctrine serves an important tax policy goal by imposing a non-
tax "friction" on parties seeking to engage in arbitrage. 28 1 By
disallowing deferral in cases involving third-party or funded
promises, the economic benefit doctrine ensures that to obtain
arbitrage benefits, the service provider must face perhaps sub-
stantial credit risk; that is, he must remain a general unse-
cured creditor of the employer, thereby subjecting his deferred
compensation to the risks of the employer's business. 28 2 On the
other hand, if third-party or funded promises were not immedi-
ately taxable, deferral and its resulting arbitrage would be
achieved without any adverse economic consequences, because
the parties could insulate the service provider from these risks
by either funding trusts or purchasing and delivering annuities
to the service provider.
CONCLUSION
We began this Article by noting that it is commonly under-
stood among tax experts that the tax treatment of compensa-
tory third-party promises is uncertain. We endeavored in this
Article to prove otherwise.
For many decades before the enactment of § 83, courts and
the IRS drew an important distinction between second-party
and third-party promises. Because the immediate taxation of
second-party promises would effectively merge the cash method
into the accrual method, these promises were not generally
considered property, and therefore not immediately taxable,
under the cash method. In contrast, third-party promises, the
immediate taxation of which would not impinge on the cash
281. Professors Scholes and Wolfson first used the term "friction" in this
context. MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS
STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 7 (1992) (using the term to "mean transac-
tion costs incurred in the marketplace that make implementation of certain
tax-planning strategies costly"). For an extensive discussion of nontax frictions
as a tool against wasteful tax planning, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a
Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 (2001).
282. Admittedly, this friction might be considered relatively weak, espe-
cially in cases where the employer is a large, established company whose
credit risk is quite low. Nevertheless, the friction is the only constraint on ar-
bitrage under the current tax regime.
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method's traditional scope, were without exception immediately
taxable. In enacting § 83, Congress codified this notion when it
used the term "property" against the backdrop of this extremely
well-developed body of law. The regulatory exclusion from the
definition of property for an "unfunded and unsecured obliga-
tion to pay money or property in the future"283 therefore should
properly be interpreted as applying only to those promises that
are issued by the service recipient. If the promise is issued by a
party external to the service relationship, the promise is tax-
able to the service provider upon its receipt.
The doctrinal conclusion that the receipt of a third-party
promise to pay always gives rise to immediate taxation com-
ports with sound tax policy. As described above, the deferred
taxation of unsecured and unfunded payment obligations pro-
vides an opportunity for tax arbitrage where the service recipi-
ent's effective tax rate on investment income is lower than that
of the service provider. If the lax deferred compensation rules
were extended to unfunded and unsecured payment obligations
issued by third parties (such obligations having been purchased
by the service recipient), then the floodgates on such arbitrage
would be opened, as the service provider would no longer have
to be subject to the service recipient's credit risk to benefit from
the tax rate arbitrage. Under such a regime, the employee
could essentially elect to utilize the employer's tax rate on in-
vestment income at the price of nominal transaction costs. Such
a regime would therefore impair the ability to tax the return to
capital of high-income individuals.
Turning back to the ECS shelter that served as the stimu-
lus for this Article, the partnership's promise issued in ex-
change for the options is a third-party promise that constitutes
property for purposes of § 83. This conclusion undermines the
intended tax benefits of the shelter. Recall that Treasury Regu-
lation § 1.83-7(a) provides that if nonstatutory stock options are
sold in an arm's-length transaction, § 83(a) applies to the prop-
erty received on the sale in the same manner that § 83(a) would
have applied to the transfer of property pursuant to the exer-
cise of the option. In other words, the seller realizes compensa-
tion income to the extent of the fair market value of property
received as consideration in the sale. Because the promissory
note issued by the partnership constitutes property for pur-
poses of § 83, the seller realizes compensation income equal to
283. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985).
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the fair market value of the note, which the ECS shelter pro-
moters were forced to argue is equal to the fair market value of
the transferred options to satisfy the arm's-length standard in
the regulations. 28 4
Accordingly, rather than achieving the intended deferral of
taxation until the long-term balloon note is satisfied, the ECS
shelter-when its tax effects are correctly interpreted-actually
has the opposite effect of accelerating income. 28 5 Thus, the ECS
shelter turns out to be yet another failed exercise by taxpayers
attempting to abuse the tax laws through an overly literal in-
terpretation of relevant statutes and regulations.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 74-82 (discussing the arm's-length
standard and concluding that, to qualify, the partnership note must at the
very least have a value equivalent to the value of the transferred options).
285. If the ECS structure were not implemented, the executive would gen-
erally realize income only upon exercise of the options. See supra text accom-
panying notes 60-65. Under the ECS structure, however, the executive real-
izes income even earlier, at the time the options are sold to the partnership.
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